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Counting Carbon: Forward-Looking Analysis Of 
Decarbonization  
 




Policy analysis primarily looks backward to solve problems of 
individual and public choice. Analysts often seek to derive and draw 
marginal curves from existing data to extrapolate observed relationships 
into the future.  Indeed, the White House Council on Environmental Quality 
recently issued a proposed rule that would, among other things, codify the 
concepts underlying these tools for environmental matters, i.e., requiring 
the considered effects of a proposed action to be “reasonably foreseeable” 
and meet a “reasonably close causal relationship.”  That proposal expresses 
a perspective with a long tradition, yet it presents a curious circumstance.  
Although marginal and statistical regression tools are among the most 
powerful methods for understanding past continuous change, their power 
and efficacy diminish when applied to discontinuous change, meaning 
disjointed or abrupt.   
This article discusses the discontinuity problem that is inherent in 
reducing atmospheric greenhouse gas emissions (decarbonization).  It 
suggests that combinatorics (i.e., mathematical analysis by counting and 
ordering) offers a useful methodology for evaluating that discontinuous 
change.  Here, a simple counting approach (viz. Equivalent Substitution 
Analysis) considers, as two corresponding sets, the discrete number and 
combination of technological substitutions that are required for 
decarbonization.  One implication of the analysis is that decarbonization 
need not be analyzed solely as a collective action problem.  The article 
proceeds by exploring decarbonization conceptually and against archetypal 
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modern analysis. The article concludes with a detailed case study of an 




In the economic sphere an act, a habit, an institution, a law 
produces not only one effect, but a series of effects. … There is 
only one difference between a bad economist and a good one: the 
bad economist confines himself to the visible effect; the good 
economist takes into account both the effect that can be seen and 
those effects that must be foreseen. 
- Bastiat, 18502 
 
Policy analysis primarily looks backward to solve problems of 
individual and public choice.  Analysts often seek to derive and draw 
marginal curves from existing data to extrapolate observed relationships 
into the future.  Indeed, the White House Council on Environmental Quality 
recently issued a proposed rule that would, among other things, codify the 
concepts underlying these tools for environmental matters, i.e., requiring 
the considered effects of a proposed action to be “reasonably foreseeable” 
and require a “reasonably close causal relationship.”3  It is a perspective 
with a long tradition, and it appears superficially sensible.  If effects are not 
reasonably foreseeable then how could they be accounted?  Further, without 
a close causal relationship there is no strong mechanism between an action 
and its consequence.  Nonetheless, although marginal and statistical 
regression tools are among our most powerful methods for understanding 
past continuous change, their power and efficacy diminish when applied to 
discontinuous change, meaning disjointed or abrupt.4  
This article discusses the discontinuity problem inherent in reducing 
atmospheric greenhouse gas emissions (decarbonization).  A general 
observation here is that decarbonization is a finite problem, one measured 
in discontinuous technological substitution.  Decarbonization is a finite 
problem because we are informed of the specific quantities of greenhouse 
gas emissions that require reduction.  It is discontinuous because the few 
 
 2.  FRÉDÉRIC BASTIAT, SELECTED ESSAYS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY — WHAT IS SEEN 
AND WHAT IS NOT SEEN 1, 2-50 (Seymour Cain trans., ed. George B. de Huszar, introduction 
by F.A. Hayek (Irvington-on-Hudson: Foundation for Economic Education, 1995) (1850). 
3. Update to the Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National 
Environmental Policy Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 1684 (proposed Jan. 10, 2020) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 1500, 1501, 1502, 1503, 1504, 1505, 1507, and 1508); see also Fact Sheet: 
CEQ’s Proposal to Modernize its NEPA Implementing Regulations, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF 
THE PRESIDENT COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (Jan. 7, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/2JEL-3U25 [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL 
QUALITY PROPOSAL]. 
4. See discussion infra Part II.A.i-ii. 
 




technological substitutes required to achieve those reductions either do or 
do not produce emissions (e.g., substituting electricity generated from a 
coal power plant for that of a wind farm), meanwhile the new non-emitting 
technologies have improved abruptly.  The claim here is that a 
combinatorics type of analysis can augment individual decision-making 
and public policy, in part, because it can reveal unseen effects.  Moreover, 
the equivalent substitution of necessary technological substitutes can be 
more readily evaluated.  This analytical approach might be referred to as 
Equivalent Substitution Analysis (in contrast to, for example, Constant 
Elasticity of Substitution) or other new coinage; for present purposes it will 
be referred to as a counting analysis, a counting approach, or, simply, 
counting.  
A counting approach considers the technological substitutions 
necessary for decarbonization as two corresponding sets: a countable group 
of relatively few technologies that are required to be replaced to reach the 
goal, and a set of new zero emission technologies that can be counted, 
ordered, and combined in different ways (permutations if you like) to meet 
such substitutions.  This allows a counting analysis to be prospective.  
Rather than looking back to historical data, individuals and policymakers 
can take action targeted to specific elements of the existing set of 
technologies thereby accounting for any decarbonization action, whether 
small, large, or cumulative.  Even a single substitution changes the 
composition of each set. 
The structure of the article is as follows.  Part I briefly sketches the 
problem of decarbonization.  Part II reviews two conceptual problems of 
modern decarbonization analysis, and introduces a counting approach.  Part 
III provides an empirical case study of an electric utility in the U.S.  The 
case study illustrates at a more granular level how a methodology of 
counting can inform individual choice and strategic regulatory planning 
even where broad social consensus is not reachable.  Electricity 
procurement stands at the nexus of decarbonization and such specificity is 
suggested as necessary to more accurate analysis.5  The article conclusions 






5. See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS — THE EVOLUTION OF 
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION, 14, 18–21 (1990) (introducing both theoretical and 
field empirical alternates to stylized assumptions regarding so-called tragedy of the 
commons) [hereinafter Ostrom].  Much modern data analysis eschews granular subject 
understanding due, perhaps, to a suspicion that knowing too much about the specific area 
introduces an opening for bias confirmation.  It is an approach that can be fruitful but also 
lead to incorrect conclusions. 
 




I. The Problem of Decarbonization in Brief 
 
Greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S. originate overwhelmingly from 
the technologies used in the converging sectors of electricity and 
transportation, together with industrial heat and steam processes.6  
Substitution of these emissions-producing technologies then presents as the 
core problem of reducing greenhouse gas emissions (decarbonization), 
despite much commentary focused elsewhere.7  The problem can further be 
expressed as a function, specifically the speed at which certain emissions-
producing technologies are excluded by means of substitution.8  All of 
which means just that decarbonization goals are time-sensitive, the 
technologies that produce emissions are in actuality quite limited, and 
therefore the problem of decarbonization can be stated as a query of how 
quickly a limited number of emissions-producing technologies are 
replaced.   
The common refrain is that the needed technological substitutions 
should be made as efficiently as possible, concluding in disparate proposals 
for favored large-scale programs of infrastructure,9 aspirational schemes of 
 
6. See LEGAL PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 
SUMMARY AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS (Michael B. Gerrard & John C. Dernbach, eds., 
2018) [hereinafter PATHWAYS]. Of the 5.279 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide emissions 
in the U.S. in 2017, 4.92 billion metric tons were traceable to fossil fuel combustion, of 
which roughly 70 percent was attributable to the electric power and transportation sectors, 
with much of the remaining balance attributable to industrial heat and steam processes.  
Carbon dioxide emissions constituted approximately 80 percent of all greenhouse gas 
emissions in 2017, although other emissions like methane are many times more potent.  See 
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS 
EMISSIONS AND SINKS 1990-2017, at ES-6 to ES-12 (2019), https://perma.cc/ ZP3W-QEVU.   
7. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein et al., How People Update Beliefs about Climate Change: 
Good News and Bad News, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1431 (2017) (reading political polarization 
into belief structures about climate change); see also RICHARD THAYER & CASS SUNSTEIN, 
NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008) 
(describing a “paternalistic libertarianism” approach to social engineering human action).  
To the extent today’s sustainable technologies are susceptible to practical and theoretical 
improvement in cost, performance, availability and so on (and whereas existing emissions-
producing technologies are comparatively exhaustively farmed in such respects), broad 
social consensus and targeted opinion shaping may be inapposite.   
8. If each element of the set of existing technologies has a correspondence with the 
elements of the set of new technological substitutes then a function is definitionally 
operable; however, a primary observation here is the lack of agreement on initial conditions 
and the failure of a limit due to the disjunctive characteristics of the elements.  See Leonard 
Euler, Leonard Euler’s Elastic Curves, 20 ISIS 72, 76 (W. A. Oldfather et al. trans., 1933).   
9. See, e.g., JB Ruhl & James Salzman, What Happens When the Green Deal Meets 
the Old Green Laws 44 VT. L. REV. 693 (2020) (arguing that colossal infrastructure projects 
in the U.S. are necessary to meet fundamental reductions in greenhouse gas emissions). 
 




taxation,10 quasi-markets,11 or anticipatory capitulation.12  Coercion 
accompanies each of these proposals.13  Despite the concentrated effort, 
general agreement on decarbonization programs remains elusive as 
evidenced by the dearth of enacting legislation.14  This is unsurprising as 
the human impacts of technological substitution can be expected to be 
 
10. See, e.g., William Nordhaus, Designing a Friendly Space for Technological 
Change to Slow Global Warming, 33 ENERGY ECON. 665 (2011) (arguing that a carbon tax 
is necessary to achieve an energy transition); see also JE Aldy et al., Resolving the Inherent 
Uncertainty of Carbon Taxes, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. F. 1 (2017); see generally Reuven 
S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global Climate Change: Why a Carbon 
Tax is a Better Response to Global Warming than Cap and Trade, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 
(2009). 
11. See generally David B. Spence, Naïve Energy Markets, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
973 (2017) (providing a useful reality check on overly neat, theoretical energy market 
resolutions to renewable energy adoption).  A note of augmentation is that proponents of 
markets often misconstrue Hayek’s thoughts on law and regulation; see, e.g., FREDERICK 
HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 397–411 (1960). 
12. See, e.g., Emanuele Massetti & Robert Mendelsohn, Measuring Climate 
Adaptation: Methods and Evidence, 12 REV. OF ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 324 (2018) 
(claiming, as Mendelsohn has in other forms elsewhere, that adaptation can be effective at 
eliminating a large fraction of potential damage from climate change, if governments would 
take the actions prescribed); see also Richard A. Rosen & Edeltraud Guenther, The 
economics of mitigating climate change: What can we know? 91 TECHNOLOGICAL 
FORECASTING AND SOC. CHANGE 93 (2015) [hereinafter Rosen & Guenther] (describing, 
among other things, cost projection defects in integrated adaptation models that reduce 
incentive for policymakers to act).  
13. See Ostrom, supra note 6.  Large scale infrastructure often requires overriding 
certain individual and community preferences through the use of eminent domain to 
accommodate power transmission infrastructure.  See, e.g., James W. Coleman & Alexandra 
B. Klass, Energy and Eminent Domain, 104 MINN. L. REV. 659 (2019) (arguing for the 
necessity of eminent domain for electricity delivered to residential homes via transmission 
(distribution) lines); see also Yael R. Lifshitz, Private Energy, 38 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 119 
(2019) [hereinafter Lifshitz] (exploring the implications of the continued trend toward 
distributed electricity generation); see also Ryan Trahan, Regulating Toward (in)Security in 
the U.S. Electricity System, 12 TEX. J. OIL, GAS & ENERGY L. 2 (2017) [hereinafter Trahan, 
Regulating]. 
14. See, e.g., CHRIS LAFAKIS ET AL., MOODY’S ANALYTICS, THE ECONOMIC 
IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2019), https://perma.cc/QYS5-FCZH. Domestically, 
the state of dialogue is captured in the “Green New Deal,” a statement of concepts provided 
by a pair of resolutions introduced by Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Ed Markey, 
respectively, H.R. Res. 109, S. Res. 59, 116th Cong. (Feb. 7, 2019) that would, among other 
things, require 100 percent domestic clean energy by 2030.  Internationally, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) provides scientifically considered 
recommendations, including that emitters reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 80 percent 
prior to 2050, measured from a base year of 2005; see, e.g., SOLOMONE FIFITA ET AL., 
MITIGATION PATHWAYS COMPATIBLE WITH 1.5°C IN THE CONTEXT OF SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT, (2018) [hereinafter IPCC Special Report].  See Memorandum of 
Understanding Between the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the 
World Meteorological Organization (WMO) on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) (1988), https://perma.cc/4Y8U-P7G2. 
 




distributed unequally.15  Additionally, individual preferences will naturally 
vary including by geographic and demographic factors.16  As will be 
discussed, the lack of general consensus presents fundamental issues for 
analyses that prize efficient outcomes.  A combinatorics approach (in its 
simplest form, analysis by counting and ordering) does not require broad 
social consensus. 
 
II. Contrasts In Analysis 
 
Efficiency and Marginal Analysis of Decarbonization 
 
Marginal analysis might be characterized as the study of any action 
taken at the margin of change, a broad and encompassing field. Although it 
risks recursion, the present inquiry concerns only methodology rather than 
epistemology.  Specifically, how is marginal analysis actually utilized to 
understand and regulate decarbonization and its technological inputs?  
Here, marginal approaches are used to measure rates of change (marginal 
rate analysis) between and among variables, with regressive analysis 
assisting where applicable.  Marginal rate analysis describes what is 
reasonably foreseeable through the study of past rates of change, while 
statistical regression techniques might be characterized as helping tease out 
historic causal relationships.17   
In the physical sciences a rate of change might describe how a 
chemical reaction proceeds in a particular environment, i.e., recognizing, 
based on observable historical data, a pattern in the changing relationship 
between variables.18  Patterns in the social sciences, however, remain less 
reliably reduceable than in the physical sciences or are otherwise trivial.  As 
will be illustrated, the modern study of marginal rates of change in the 
social sciences avoids trite conclusions by abstracting the effects resulting 
from human inputs.  An example is the rate at which groups of humans, 
rather than any one individual, reduce or increase greenhouse gas emissions 
into the atmosphere generally.  Analyzing group behaviors avoids déclassé 
 
15. See generally Xavier Gabaix, Power Laws in Economics: An Introduction, 30 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 185, 196–197 (2016) [hereinafter Gabaix]; see also STEPHANE HALLEGATTE 
ET AL., WORLD BANK, MANAGING THE IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON POVERTY, 83–85, 
91–97 (2016). 
16. See, e.g., Peter Howe et al., Geographic Variation in Opinions on Climate 
Change at State and Local Scales in the USA, 5 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 596 (2015); see 
also Gary M. Lucas Jr., Behavioral Public Choice and the Carbon Tax, 2017 UTAH L. REV. 
115 (2017). 
17. See, e.g., Richard T. Carson & Kevin Novan, The Private and Social Economics 
of Bulk Electricity Storage, 66 J. OF ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 404 (2013). 
18. See, e.g., JOHN A. CONKLING & CHRISTOPHER MOCELLA, CHEMISTRY OF 
PYROTECHNICS 38–40, 116, 128–31 (3d ed. 2019) (describing variables in high energy 
reactions). 
 




evaluations of each discrete, incremental unit of production, consumption, 
or otherwise, and (purportedly) much of the normative weight that goes 
with it.  Marginal rate analysis is then freed to identify a continuous range 
of outputs traceable to a basket of historic inputs, smoothing the jagged 
edges of problematic micro action. 
Notwithstanding methodological defects, the chief aim of such 
analytical tools is a desire to achieve an inchoate future efficiency, the 
lodestar of positivist thinking.19  As noted in the introduction, the White 
House Council on Environmental Quality proposal for updating procedural 
mechanisms in the National Environmental Policy Act is an example, i.e., 
requiring the considered effects of a proposed action to be “reasonably 
foreseeable” and meet a “reasonably close causal relationship.”20  Viewed 
neutrally, that proposal reduces to a desire to efficiently balance (optimize) 
a desire to allow actions/projects to proceed faster against a preference to 
avoid certain environmental harms based on historical experience.  Two 
specific problems associated with using marginal analysis in this way will 
be introduced shortly. 
For now, a few words of context on the aim of efficiency are 
necessary, although a philosophical exploration far outpaces this 
discussion,.  Very generally, a regulator could define efficiency as the state 
of affairs where it is not possible to take action that would improve upon a 
situation without also reducing the welfare of at least one of the parties 
concerned.21  That view is likely to prove problematic as it conflicts even 
with a positivist perspective of regulatory action, the purpose of which is to 
allocate burdens and benefits unequally on and among different 
 
19. See, e.g., Avery Katz, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Economics, 94 
MICH. L. REV. 2229 (1996); see also Ann Chih Lin, Bridging Positivist and Interpretivist 
Approaches to Qualitative Methods, 26 POL. STUD. J. 162 (1998); see generally Brian Leiter, 
Legal Positivism as a Realist Theory of Law, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO LEGAL 
POSITIVISM (P. Mindus & T. Spaak eds., forthcoming 2020); see also Richard A. Posner, 
The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEX. L. REV. 757 (1975). 
20. See WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY PROPOSAL, supra note 
3. 
21. See VILFREDO PARETO, THE MIND AND SOCIETY 2063–79 (Arthur Livingston ed., 
Andrew Bongiorno trans., 1935) (1919); for a brief histography, see Fiorenzo Mornati, 
Pareto Optimality in the work of Pareto, 51 EURO. J. SOC. SCI. 65 (2013); see also FRANK J. 
GOODNOW, COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
SYSTEMS, NATIONAL AND LOCAL, OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, FRANCE, AND 
GERMANY, 9–14, 127, 135 (1893) (an early proponent of the idea that bureaucracy is 
unavoidable and that the efficiency of administration is of the utmost importance) 
[hereinafter GOODNOW]; see also Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost 
World of Administrative Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1188–89 (2014) (noting that a sole goal 
of efficiency may involve excessive sacrifices to, for example, the fairness of individuals). 
 




constituencies.22  Even seemingly “inert” or “fair” proposals would 
intentionally hurt some and help others; if not then such proposals would 
be ineffectual.23  One immediate consequence is that considerations of 
efficiency remain normative and relative  at center. 
In the specific context of decarbonization normative concerns of 
efficiency show odd empirical contours.  As one example, it is frequently 
observed that the ownership of the energy technologies that currently 
predominate (mining equipment, fossil generation plants, et cetera) has a 
correspondence with the distribution of societal wealth.24  A consequence 
then of regulatory action promoting decarbonization is the potential for 
greater disruption to existing owners, especially as the pace of substitution 
of existing energy technologies increases.25  Yet, goals of efficiency must 
be determined from some initial set of conditions.  Today those conditions 
would include, in the U.S., the power distribution of wealth.  All of which 
provides familiar explanation for why achieving “efficient” regulatory 
proposals, such as a neutral carbon tax, remain a remote prospect. 
Nonetheless, if marginal analysis were simply a tool of narrowly-
defined “efficiency” then a reasoned skepticism might question why such 
analysis should enjoy broad acceptance?  The fundamental justification is 
simply that marginal rate analysis is a powerful tool for seeking efficient 
outcomes from the incremental, continuous type of change that experience 
indicates is most common.  Decarbonization is not a problem of continuity, 
however.   
No necessary social consensus or technical basis has formed that 
would allow the “efficient” pursuit of decarbonization.  It is a contentious 
 
22. See generally DWIGHT WALDO, THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: A STUDY OF THE 
POLITICAL THEORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (1948) (undermining claims of 
inert efficiency by perceiving administrative action as inextricably and understandably 
political in nature, if not overtly so in execution). 
23. See generally A.M. Sen, The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal, 78 J. POL. ECON. 
152, 155 (1970) (illustrating why liberal values might result in greater readership of certain 
books, even where such a result is Pareto inferior); see also KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL 
CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 4, 7, 91 (1951). 
24. See generally Gabaix, supra note 16; see also William K. Carroll & M. Jouke 
Huijzer, WHO OWNS CANADA’S FOSSIL-FUEL SECTOR? MAPPING THE NETWORK OF 
OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL, 3, 13–16 (2018) (showing that twenty-five entities account for 
approximately 40 percent of fossil revenues in Canada); see also UNEP FINANCE INITIATIVE, 
UNIVERSAL OWNERSHIP: WHY ENVIRONMENTAL EXTERNALITIES MATTER TO INSTITUTIONAL 
INVESTORS (2011) (an institutional explainer on the concept of universal ownership). 
 25. Or, as you like, this represents a process of partial rebalancing and incorporation of 
the externalities by which such owners originally acquired their share of wealth.  Discussion 
of “stranded assets” (e.g., a power plant that fails to fully amortize because it is replaced 
with a new technology that does not produce emissions) may then reasonably be viewed as 
socially relevant to the extent that no economic substitutes are available to meet the 
consumptive needs of non-owners.  Common argumentative strategies are employed to 
convert problems of asset ownership into social costs, although the course and pace of 
technological development appears to run counter to such efforts.  See infra note 61.  
 




and finite problem whose solutions are predicated on binary, discontinuous 
technological substitution.  Thus, the use of abstraction in marginal 
analysis, often brilliantly handled,26 is exposed in the context of 
decarbonization as a functional defect.  Abstraction instead works best 
when initial conditions are stable.27  
The difference is profound.  By framing the problem of 
decarbonization as a question of societal efficiency, marginal rate analysis 
merely seeks optimization thereby understating the urgency that inheres in 
programs of decarbonization.28  Simultaneously, as will be discussed, 
efficiency analysis overstates the social impact of necessary, but limited, 
technological substitutions and misconstrues the power of individual 
choice.  As the later discussion in the case study describes, the new 
technological substitutes allowing for decarbonization are comparatively 
improved—cleaner, safer, less clumsy, more abundant, increasingly 
cheaper. This technological reality provides an independent normative 
basis (apart from efficiency) for  improving the general welfare through the 
technological substitutions that are necessary to reduce greenhouse gas 
 
26. Consider Zeno’s paradox of motion and Russell’s insightful response.  A freeze 
frame of an arrow in flight would not show movement.  If the arrow is not moving at that 
one specific instant, then when is the arrow moving, as each instant the arrow would be 
motionless.  Russell observed that the arrow is not moving at any one instant but that motion, 
change, can be observed only through seeing the arrow “at” a certain point and then “at” 
another.  The description of change for the arrow between two such points (or its existence 
at each point along the continuum), including its deceleration toward some finite limit, is a 
garden variety example of the calculus of marginal analysis.  It may not ultimately describe 
reality, but its real-world importance is difficult to overstate.  See generally WESLEY C. 
SALMON, CAUSALITY AND EXPLANATION 21-22 (Oxford University Press 1992). 
27. See, e.g., STEVEN STROGATZ, THE CALCULUS OF FRIENDSHIP (2009) (“Yet in 
another way, calculus is fundamentally naive, almost childish in its optimism. Experience 
teaches us that change can be sudden, discontinuous, and wrenching.  Calculus draws its 
power by refusing to see that.  It insists on a world without accidents, where one thing leads 
logically to another.  Give me the initial conditions and the law of motion, and with calculus 
I can predict the future—or better yet, reconstruct the past.”).  
28. Programs of decarbonization reflect an effort to establish a correspondence 
between atmospheric inputs (of greenhouse gas emissions) and probabilistic risk outputs 
(catastrophic storms, sea level changes, et cetera).  Such correspondences carry uncertainty 
in both measurement and forecast.  The risks of not decarbonizing, however, are widely 
understood as existential, whether from an economic perspective or at a species level.  It 
reasonably follows that if a particular social program is intended to result in sufficient 
decarbonization—otherwise why bother—then overcorrecting to the defined goal is the only 
reasonable type of error, i.e., Type 1 errors may reasonably be viewed as unacceptable in 
programs of decarbonization due to the qualitative character of the risk.  See generally 
STEPHEN J. DECANIO, ECONOMIC MODELS OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2003). 
 




emissions.29  The commitment to and focus on incremental marginal 
methods persists nevertheless, and in two primary forms. 
 
i. The Issue of Continuity Bias 
 
Aggregated historical data often serves as an excellent input for 
constructing models of continuous change, with smooth curves reflecting a 
model of past quantitative experience.  For the same reason, historical data 
are often an especially poor predictor, or contemporaneous descriptor, of 
discontinuous change.  When an observed social relationship is disrupted—
whether from adoption of substitute technologies, new regulation, or 
otherwise—relying on past quantitative data risks misconstruing the very 
nature of the problem.  This is precisely because the phenomena or their 
inter-relationships are new and not reflected in past data, even when lags in 
compiling and analyzing data can be reasonably controlled.   
Modern quantitative techniques twined to show continuity frequently 
exacerbate the risks.  At the level of methodological technique this is well-
understood; in calculus, it appears as the undefined derivative of peaked 
change, in economics it is described in the step change functions that 
discretely shift carefully plotted curves.  There are few if any redemptive 
strategies for mitigating the problem of discontinuous change through 
marginal and regressive methodologies.30  The following provides an 
archetypal example of modern policy analysis, illustrating the difficulty 
inherent in drawing best-fit lines through past data to extrapolate 
conclusions into the future. 
 
Example: Continuity Bias in Analysis of Renewable Portfolio 
Standards 
 
Renewable portfolio standards are a mechanism by which 
governmental subdivisions may establish a percentage, or some magnitude, 
of electricity generation that must be derived from renewable sources.31  In 
the U.S., these arrangements are generally state-level programs, mostly 
enacted a decade ago, that were intended to incentivize the procurement of 
renewable electricity generation.  Prior empirical study has indicated that 
the enactment of renewable portfolio standards tended to correspond with 
 
29. See generally JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, BUSINESS CYCLES:  A THEORETICAL, 
HISTORICAL, AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CAPITALIST PROCESS (1939) (Surplus 
values may be impossible in circumstances of perfect equilibrium but, largely fortunately, 
we never actually experience such conditions). 
30. See David Lee & Thomas Lemieux, Regression Discontinuity Designs in 
Economics, 48 J. OF ECON. LIT. 281 (2010). 
31. See generally Thomas P. Lyon & Haitao Yin, Why Do States Adopt Renewable 
Portfolio Standards?: An Empirical Investigation, 31 THE ENERGY J. 131 (2010). 
 




normative preferences for cleaner energy.32  It is nevertheless expected that 
analysts might ask whether renewable portfolio standards are, or were, 
“effective.”   
A recent working paper (“DRD Study”) in economics answered the 
question by purporting to isolate the effect that such standards had on the 
cost of retail electricity, and on rates of renewables adoption.33  To wit, if 
renewable portfolio standards did not increase uptake of renewable 
generation technologies, or were especially costly, then perhaps it could be 
concluded that they were not effective.  The principal findings of the study 
were indeed negative: that renewable portfolio standards raise (are highly 
correlated with increased) electricity prices and are a comparatively 
expensive method to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.34  It is a curious 
conclusion that requires some effort to conjure. 
The exercise in the DRD Study was to take data measurements for 
twenty-nine states with mandatory renewable portfolio standards in two 
separate time periods: seven years and twelve years, respectively, after a 
state enacted a standard.  Those results were then compared against states 
that did not enact renewable portfolio standards, in an effort to control for 
effects on retail prices and adoption rates.35  However, the analyzed data set 
covered only the years from 1990 to 2015.36  This is noteworthy as no 
twelve-year data could have been sampled for programs enacted after 2003.  
Meaning that perhaps 23 states, or 79 percent of the samples, could not have 
been included in the results, without adjustment.  Furthermore, neither 
seven nor twelve-year data could have been included for standards enacted 
after 2008, meaning that five states, or 17 percent of the data set could not 
have been measured at all, without adjustment, according to the study 
parameters.37  This represents breath-taking selective sampling, although 
alone, it is of limited interest to the issue being referred to as Continuity 
Bias.  Consider, however, this approach to sampling in the context of the 
time period measured.   
 
32. Thomas P. Lyon & Haitao Yin, supra note 31. 
33. See Michael Greenstone et al., Do Renewable Portfolio Standards Deliver? 
(ENERGY POL’Y INST. UNIV. CHI., Working Paper No. 2019–62, 2019) [hereinafter DRD 
Study]. See generally Robinson Meyer, A Very Important Climate Fact That No One Knows, 
THE ATLANTIC (May 8, 2019), https://perma.cc/ R9HS-WQQL.   
34. DRD Study, supra note 33, at 25.  
35. Id. at 7, 8, 25. 
36. DRD Study, supra note 33, at 13, 31. 
37. The extent of this sampling problem is likely understated as there is no control 
group and it is not clear that “sampled” and “unsampled” data did not circulate temporally 
between the two categories studied.  The authors gesture to one aspect of this problem in 
their caveats: DRD Study, supra note 33, at 24 (“[a] more broadly randomized control trial 
is unavailable here so there will always be a form of unobserved heterogeneity that could 
explain the results without [renewable portfolio standards] programs playing a causal role.”). 
 




Reasonable opinions may vary on the exact years but the time period 
from roughly 2010 to the present has come to be seen as the time of the 
“energy transition.”  One cause attributed to that transition is that from 2010 
to 2019—a period commencing after the enactment of all the mandatory 
renewable portfolio standards in the DRD Study and extending past the end 
of the study’s data set—the installed price of solar generation dropped by 
approximately 84 percent while wind generation dropped by 67 percent.38  
A more recent cost input change is that battery energy storage prices 
dropped by nearly 76 percent just from 2012 to 2018  (three years past the 
end of the data set but more than a year prior to the study’s release).39  
Despite the attention these disruptive cost trends have garnered, the DRD 
Study design sought to remove the factor of temporality, albeit only for very 
old renewable portfolio standards.40  This leads closer to the heart of 
Continuity Bias.  A disclaimer from the study’s abstract finishes the table 
setting: “[t]hese results do not rule out the possibility that [renewable 
portfolio standard] policies could dynamically reduce the cost of abatement 
in the future by causing improvements in renewable technology.”41 
It is sound that the DRD Study results do not rule out that possibility 
as even a cursory market review confirms that a process of adoption of 
 
38. See, e.g., LAZARD, LEVELIZED COST OF ENERGY 7-8 (version 13.0 2019) 
[hereinafter LAZARD]; see also GOLDMAN SACHS EQUITY RESEARCH: NEXTGEN POWER 
SOLAR TO TRANSFORM EUROPE’S ENERGY MIX (2018); see also RAN FU ET AL., NAT’L 
RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB’Y, U.S. SOLAR PHOTOVOLTAIC SYSTEM COST BENCHMARK: Q1 
2018, at 7 (2018), https://perma.cc/YGS7-F9BL [hereinafter NREL BENCHMARK]; see also 
U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, WIND TECHNOLOGIES MARKET REPORT 69, https://perma.cc/3GMB-
C9BR.  
39. See, e.g., Battery Power’s Latest Plunge in Costs Threatens Coal, Gas, 
BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FIN. (Mar. 26, 2019), https://perma.cc/G28Q-FFZ7 (reporting 
that the levelized cost for lithium-ion batteries fell 35 percent to $187 per megawatt-hour 
since the first half of 2018); see also WOOD MACKENZIE, U.S. ENERGY STORAGE MONITOR 
Q4 (2018); see also DRD Study, supra note 33, at 1. 
 40. This latter development perhaps explains the DRD Study’s hoary language about 
the claimed advantages of natural gas peaker plants that are, today, being replaced by battery 
energy storage solutions.  DRD Study, supra note 33, at 3.  The exhaustively studied problem 
of intermittency in renewables (the availability, or non-dispatchability, of solar and wind 
generation varies temporally according to the effects of solar warming) is not strongly linked 
with the use of gas “peaker” plants, which, in actuality, are now being consistently retired 
for economic reasons, replaced with better performing battery energy storage solutions. See, 
e.g., PUB. UTIL. COMM’N E-4949, Energy Div. (Ca. 2018), https://perma.cc/QW2A-
KS9D (approving the replacement of three natural gas peaker plants with battery energy 
storage for economic reasons). 
41. DRD Study, supra note 33, at 1. 
 




renewables dynamically led to improvements in cost and performance.42  
Stated differently, there was no singular scientific advance in photovoltaic 
solar panels or wind turbine technology over the past decade.  Instead, a 
tight cycle of adoption resulted in iterative, incremental, hard-won 
improvements from scale, design, learning-by-doing, capital efficiency, 
and so on. 
The Continuity Bias in the DRD Study’s regressive analysis is no 
more nuanced than that: it treats dynamically changing technologies as 
static, then extrapolates to future relationships a story about past data.  
While the authors do expressly acknowledge that the central problem is 
likely dynamic change rather than the one studied,43 the study’s conclusions 
show that the impact of this observation is not well understood, the authors 
state that:  
 
While the potential damages from global climate change have 
been widely documented, it is almost self-evident that failing to 
cost-effectively reduce emissions will ultimately limit the 
magnitude of these reductions.44 
 
In no sense is such a conclusion self-evident.  Rather, the study simply 
arrived back at its normative docking station of short-run efficiency.  By 
 
42. See, e.g., Goksin Kavlak et al., Evaluating the Causes of Cost Reduction in 
Photovoltaic Modules, 123 ENERGY POL’Y 700, 710 (2018) [hereinafter Kavlak & Trancik] 
(tracing reductions in solar pricing since 2001 to economies of scale and endogenous 
factors); see also Unni Pillai, Drivers of Cost Reduction in Solar Photovoltaics, 50 ENERGY 
ECON. 286, 291, 293 (2015) (tracing reductions in solar prices primarily to decreases in 
polysilicon prices and usage).  See also Harry Apostoleris et al., Evaluating the Factors that 
Led to Low-Priced Solar Electricity Projects in the Middle East, 4 NATURE ENERGY 833 
(2019) (reviewing evidence that the input of cost of capital is (and was) a chief determinant 
for renewables deployment that materially improves with scale); see also FRANKFURT SCH. 
OF FIN. & MGMT. – U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, GLOBAL TRENDS IN RENEWABLE ENERGY 
INVESTMENT 16–18 (2018), https://perma.cc/HC6F-QKT9 (reviewing favorable wind and 
solar pricing, cost, and deployment trends from increased investment).  See NREL 
BENCHMARK, supra note 38, at 7 (The National Renewable Energy Laboratory provides a 
well-known annual longitudinal cost breakdown of solar prices that provides further support 
for this perspective, illustrating the importance of “soft” cost inputs); see also SCOTT 
MOSKOWITZ, GTM RESEARCH, Trends in Solar Technology and System Prices (2018); see 
generally BRONWYN H. HALL & BEETHIKA KHAN, Adoption of New Technology, in NEW 
ECON. HANDBOOK 3, 5 (2003) [hereinafter HALL] (“Yet it is diffusion [widespread adoption] 
rather than invention or innovation that ultimately determines the pace of economic growth 
and the rate of change of productivity.”). 
43. DRD Study, supra note 33, at 24 (“The coincidence of the proliferation of policies 
that support renewable energy and the decline in solar prices over the last decade are 
consistent with the possibility of such spillovers.  However, research that isolates the 
magnitude of any such spillovers from other factors is probably best described as emerging, 
making this is a rich area for future research.”). 
44. DRD Study, supra note 33, at 25. 
 




contrast, the experience of technological adoption in this context (or capital 
investment in a related context)45 guides that short run cost-effectiveness is 
largely beside the point, or at least far from the near-tautology the authors 
perceive.  Certainly, a conclusion of the necessity of cost-effectiveness 
cannot be said to follow from the regressive analysis that proceeds it in the 
DRD Study; indeed, the opposite seems a much more reasonable finding.   
To more understand this aspect of the issue of Continuity Bias from 
another perspective, consider the methodology of the DRD Study against 
the proposed rule of the White House Council on Environmental Quality, 
i.e., that environmental effects should not be considered unless there is a 
“reasonably close causal relationship” to the proposed action.46  The authors 
of the DRD Study transparently acknowledged that it was likely that 
renewable portfolio standards caused, “improvements in renewable 
technology.”47  Yet, understandably, they could not describe the new 
relationship using regressive methodologies operating on superannuated 
data.  In substitute, the DRD Study told a story about continuous change in 
a time period of abrupt technological transition.  This is analogous to the 
methodological deficiencies that the proposed rule from the Council on 
Environmental Quality would codify, i.e., where only what can be shown 
by marginal and (statistical) regressive methodologies that previously 
happened can be considered, notwithstanding empirical evidence to the 
contrary.48  The DRD Study serves as a straight-forward example of what 
is being referred to as Continuity Bias—here, misexplaining a 
discontinuous reality by pairing selectively-sampled superannuated data 
together with overriding assumptions of continuity. 
 
ii. The Issue of Abstraction Bias 
 
Abstraction is the label used here to refer to the level and manner in 
which the problem of decarbonization is formulated.  The claim is that the 
typical manner of abstracting the problem of decarbonization leads to bias 
because marginal rate analysis requires a continuum to make non-trivial 
observations and predictions about human action.  As a facile example, 
consider if, next Tuesday, your good friend installs solar panels with battery 
energy storage and also purchases an electric car.  This circumstance is 
 
45. See generally R.H. Coase, The Marginal Cost Controversy, 13 ECONOMICA 169 
(1946) (describing the need to separate the delivery and generation price of electricity and 
warning against blindly setting marginal price to marginal cost in contravention of other 
considerations); see also George Priest, Ronald Coase, Firms and Markets 8–9, 11–13 
(YALE L. & ECON., RSCH PAPER NO. 510, 2014), https://perma.cc/VFK5-37XS.  
46. See WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY PROPOSAL, supra note 3. 
47. DRD Study, supra note 33, at 1, 24, 25. 
48. See discussion infra Section II.B.; see also WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY PROPOSAL, supra note 3. 
 




problematic for establishing a marginal rate of change.  On Monday, the 
day prior, your friend was producing many tons of yearly direct emissions, 
but none the next day.49  That binary change presents a quandary: your 
friend’s rate of emissions went from some number to zero, it presents as 
discontinuous.   
Marginal rate analyses sidestep the challenge by means of abstraction.  
Specifically, the discrete actions of an individual (solar panels with battery 
energy storage and an electric car) are reconsidered in the aggregate, e.g., 
what is the effect on the efficiency of the electricity system as a result of 
such actions?  Through iteration, individual and cumulative effects (a defect 
of macro integration) are consistently discounted in the analysis.50 
Consider the issue of Abstraction Bias directly in the context of an 
electric utility.  Most commentary in the electric utility industry assumes 
that the relationship between electricity generation and greenhouse gas 
emissions reduces to a positivist question of efficiency.  Specifically, how 
can a bad consequence (emissions) be minimized while a good outcome 
(electricity generation) is maximized?  Electric utilities typically report a 
single average emissions metric measured over the duration of a year.51  
Yet, adjusting a rate of emissions efficiency requires incremental change in 
either emissions or generation, as those variables relate to one another.  If 
the same electric utility introduces a new power plant that does not emit 
pollutants, then this efficiency measure is not operable at the discrete level.   
Like your friend, above, the substitution is discontinuous: there are 
zero direct emissions per unit of electricity generated from a new renewable 
generating plant such as a wind or solar farm. 
Modern marginal rate analyses compensate for the disruption by 
abstracting the effect of the renewable power plant to the system level, e.g., 
the utility’s power plant portfolio, the local electricity delivery system, or 
perhaps the regional market.  Here, marginal rate analysis remains apposite 
as the new zero emissions plant simply causes a change (a jagged edge) in 
the overall (smooth) pattern of the electric utility’s aggregate generation.  
From a marginal perspective, nothing more has occurred than an 
incremental change in the emissions efficiency metric of the electric 
utility.52   
 
49. “Direct” in this case is intended to approximate the concept of Scope 1 emissions. 
50. See generally Kevin M. Stack & Michael P. Vandenbergh, The One Percent 
Problem, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1385 (2011); see also Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne C. 
Steinemann, Carbon Neutral Individual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1673 (2007). 
51. See discussion infra Part III. 
52. This type of exercise is used by electric utilities to demonstrate progress toward 
goals of decarbonization by, among other things, highlighting the improved emissions 
efficiency from substituting natural gas for coal.  Regrettably, those implementations often 
present as immediately efficient while ensuring that decarbonization goals cannot be timely 
met because the deployment of natural gas establishes a base level of emissions incompatible 
with goals of decarbonization.   
 




One apparent issue with relying on a marginal rate metric in this way 
is that it cannot capture energy conservation and energy efficiency, because 
differential rates do not measure what is not there. Restated, displacement 
of demand with energy efficiency does not directly impact a utility’s rate 
of emissions at the margin because kilowatt hours that are never used are 
not a variable in the calculation.  Such metrics, while frequently understood 
to be a neutral, fail to directly account for an entire class of approaches to 
decarbonization.   
A less obvious effect is that the abstraction from the micro to the 
macro (system level) transmutes the question of which electricity 
generation and delivery technologies should be selected.  It converts a 
consideration of discrete technological choice (is this renewable power 
plant or photovoltaic panel on this house a good thing) into a problem of 
system analysis (is the impact of that renewable power plant or solar panel 
on the overall electricity system a good thing).  The lodestar of “efficiency” 
serves as both the justification for moving the analysis from the micro to 
the macro and as the rubric for evaluating the resulting technology options.  
Once the objective is changed to “system efficiency,” the renewable power 
plant or solar panel can be characterized as detrimental.53   
Abstracting the problem from the micro removed an evaluation of 
whether the effect on the system needs to be realistic, whether it remains 
necessary.  Technological substitution in this context carries with it at least 
two types of optionality.  The first at the level of the technological artifact 
itself (which device should we select) and, second, at the system level as a 
disruptive micro change introduced new options for replacing part of the 
system (how should electricity be delivered).  Rather than representing an 
abstract example of the vagueness paradox, this is descriptive of one way 
in which disruptive technologies may change fundamental socio-technical 
processes.54   
As detailed later, the electric utility sector consists of remarkably few 
emissions-producing inputs, a circumstance arrived by way of historical 
technological limitations.55  For this reason and others, many of the seminal 
thinkers on electricity procurement were sure that the electricity system 
 
53. See generally Frank W. Geels, Regime Resistance Against Low-Carbon 
Transitions: Introducing Politics and Power into the Multi-Level Perspective, 31 THEORY, 
CULTURE & SOC’Y 21, 21–40 (2014) [hereinafter Geels]; see also Ivan Penn, Florida’s 
Utilities Keep Homeowners From Making the Most of Solar Power, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 
2019), https://perma.cc/KG2J-RNZ6.  
54. See Geels, supra note 53; see also Dorothy Edgington, The Philosophical 
Problem of Vagueness, 7 LEG. THEORY 371 (2001).   
55. See generally THOMAS P. HUGHES, NETWORKS OF POWER: ELECTRIFICATION IN 
WESTERN SOCIETY, 1880-1930 (1993) [hereinafter HUGHES]. 
 




itself could never be different.56  Yet, it already is.57  It reasonably follows 
that substituting out even more technological elements may further alter the 
structure of the system itself, due to iterative improvements resulting from 
adoption of new technology.  This view is bolstered by an understanding of 
certain technical aspects of electricity networks.58 
 
A. Normative Counting Analysis 
 
The discussion above reviewed defects of certain marginal (and 
statistical regression) tools as applied to decarbonization.  Such approaches 
were shown to be predicated on unexamined assumptions of the need for 
social efficiency, general cost effectiveness, and the permanency of existing 
systems.  A counting analysis, by contrast, is intended as a purely normative 
approach.  It is the expression of a preference for fewer greenhouse gas 
emissions made at the individual, community, or more aggregated level.  
Although decarbonization is often framed as a collective action problem, a 
counting analysis reveals that such characterizations are not strictly 
necessary, with consequences for strategic planning intended to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
i. Existing Set, New Set 
 
Consider the set of discrete technological artifacts that must be 
substituted (“Existing Set”) in correspondence with the second set of new 
substitute technologies (“New Set”).  The Existing Set of fossil 
technologies has been counted, it is definite subject to periodic discrete 
additions and subtractions.  The New Set, while less definite, is today well 
described, e.g., wind, solar, battery energy storage, electric vehicles.59 
 
56. See, e.g., id. at 1. (“A great network of power lines which will forever order the 
way in which we live is now superimposed on the industrial world”).   
57. It took roughly 40 years (1976 to ~ 2016) for one million distributed solar 
installations to be reached; and three years (2016 to 2019) for the second million distributed 
installations.  See WOOD MACKENZIE, SOLAR MARKETS—THE UNITED STATES SURPASSES 2 
MILLION SOLAR INSTALLATIONS (2019) [hereinafter WOODMAC DISTRIBUTED SOLAR 
REPORT]. 
58. See discussion infra Section III.A.i. 
 59. This circumstance is recent.  Less than a decade ago it was still reasonably uncertain 
which technologies could deliver on decarbonization goals.  The interim improvement in the 
New Set substitutes occurred so quickly, however, that the debate is no longer live.  This is 
not the same as saying new technologies will not be invented or some other perilous future 
casting.  Rather, the New Set of technologies have abruptly become capable of achieving 
goals of decarbonization, and those goals include inherent time constraints.  This is the type 
of uncommon discontinuous change that historical tools, like marginal rate and regressive 
analysis, are constructed to miss. 
 




As such, the types of elements in the New Set may be treated as 
generally known, albeit dynamic in application.60  In the context of certain 
transportation technologies, a direct bijection may be possible between the 
Existing Set and the New Set, e.g., for the subset of passenger vehicles, one 
electric car corresponds to the replacement of one internal combustion 
engine car.  For electricity generation and energy applications, a 
correspondence will still mostly obtain although potentially in different 
(non-injective) proportions.61  Counting describes the exchange of a limited 
number of elements between these two sets because decarbonization is a 
finite goal.   
The sets are, of course, different.  Replacing the Existing Set is defined 
as a normative exercise; the corresponding changes in the New Set are 
technologically driven in the manner described.  The improvement and 
transition of the New Set is expected to be driven by entrepreneur, firm, 
and market processes influenced by, among other things, governmental 
subsidies and penalties, including beneficial and detrimental regulatory 
actions.62  This framework naturally leads to a question as to whether 
general differences can be observed, at the set level, as between the Existing 
Set and the New Set?   
 
ii. Improvement Gap 
 
Ignoring emissions, a principal difference between the two sets is the 
practical and theoretical potential for improvement (Improvement Gap) of 
the constituent technological artifacts.  The Existing Set consists of artifacts 
that are reliant on physical processes that have been more or less maximized 
in practical performance, e.g., steam turbines for boiling water, internal 
combustion engines, and so on.  Indeed, even the theoretical range of 
 
60. Allocating resources to truly speculative research rather than iterative design 
improvement, demand-creation, or direct and immediate technological substitution 
expresses the opinion that design, manufacturing, and scale improvements of existing 
technologies are likely to be so economically inadequate that a material percentage of the 
time window and investment available to decarbonize should be spent casting about for 
invention.  Proponents of “blue sky” inventions are therefore making two related bets, a 
parlay: brand new technologies will be so improved as to overcome the time value problem 
of carbon emissions, and such inventions can be realized with time to spare for necessary 
social adoption.  See, e.g., Carlos Anchondo, Bill Gates-Backed Startup Claims Solar 
‘Breakthrough.’ Is it?, E&E NEWS (Nov. 20, 2019), https://perma.cc/9FKC-2LDV. 
61. The problem of decarbonization is a function of the speed at which a finite 
number of emission-causing technologies are excluded by means of substitution out of the 
Existing Set from the New Set. 
62. See generally JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
(Redvers Opie trans., 1934).   
 




performance of the technologies in the Existing Set is established and 
largely realized.63   
The New Set is essentially opposite.  Its technological artifacts remain 
susceptible to very substantial improvement, both practical and 
theoretical.64  As described, the pace of practical improvement is largely 
dependent on increased adoption.  Figure 1 provides a simplified visual 





63.     Internal combustion engines, steam turbines, and other established technologies 
are well farmed.  Notably, the natural gas revolution, as it were, was propelled primarily by 
technological gains in procurement, not improvements in generation.  See, e.g., Xinglin Lei 
et al., Fault Reactivation and Earthquakes with Magnitudes of up to Mw4.7 Induced by 
Shale-Gas Hydraulic Fracturing in Sichuan Basin, China, 7 SCI. REP. 1 (Aug. 2017), 
https://perma.cc/PCG5-9ZZA; see also Richard S. Middleton et al., The Shale Gas 
Revolution: Barriers, Sustainability, and Emerging Opportunities, 199 APPLIED ENERGY 88, 
88-95 (2017). 
64. Take the theoretical limits of solar generation as an example, as the potential for 
practical gains are relatively more obvious. See generally William Shockley & Hans J. 
Queisser, Detailed Balance Limit of Efficiency of p-n Junction Solar Cells, 32 J. APP. 
PHYSICS 510, 519 (1961), https://perma.cc/MX2Q-Q8BL (describing an efficiency limit of 
~ 30 percent and observing that the highest in-lab efficiency value achieved at that time was 
14 percent); see also Markus Einzinger et al., Sensitization of Silicon by Singlet Exciton 
Fission in Tetracene 571 NATURE 90 (2019) (describing a method, in a manner analogous 
to cogeneration, where excess heat from high energy blue and green light is used to excite 
more than one electron, resulting in potential single cell efficiencies of perhaps 35 percent, 
a fundamental change); see also Tristan Deppe & Jeremy Munday, Nighttime Photovoltaic 
Cells: Electrical Power Generation by Optically Coupling with Deep Space, 7 CS 
PHOTONICS 1, 1-9 (2019); see also Fahhad H. Alharbia & Sabre Kais, Theoretical Limits of 
Photovoltaics Efficiency and Possible Improvements by Intuitive Approaches Learned from 
Photosynthesis and Quantum Coherence, 43 RENEWABLE AND SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REVS. 
1073, 1074-1076 (2015) (providing a clear recitation of the state of then-current and still-
relevant technological solar progress, including multiple-cell layered approaches, prior to 
main discussion on quantum aspects and photosynthesis potentially applicable to 
photovoltaics); see generally JENNY NELSON, THE PHYSICS OF SOLAR CELLS 291, 297 (2003). 
 




Figure 1: Technologies Determining Greenhouse Gas Emissions: 
Simplified Set Comparison. 
 
Counting gives rise to the qualitative observation of the Improvement 
Gap by expressly recognizing that elements of the Existing Set must 
correspond to the New Set.  A counting approach is therefore always 
prospective as it must evaluate technological improvement as it is or will 
be, rather than how it has been.  An effort might be made to convert the 
Improvement Gap into a quantitative value for specific discrete 
substitutions.  For now, it is suggested that the Improvement Gap is also 
useful as merely a qualitative observation.65 
 
iii. Time, Efficiency, and Localized Effects 
 
The disparate capacity for improvement between the Existing Set and 
the New Set means that future gains in performance favor the New Set.  The 
comparatively greater progress of the New Set technologies then mitigates 
the need for a separate normative justification for decarbonization: “better” 
and less expensive technologies generally win regardless of belief 
structures.  It follows that, to the extent the Improvement Gap holds, the 
technologies of the New Set can be expected to replace the artifacts in the 
Existing Set over time.   
Goals of decarbonization, however, do not require or admit of external 
temporal measures.  Specifically, decarbonization goals are already 
calibrated to the time in which it has been determined useful to substantially 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions.66  A preference for decarbonization is 
thereby revealed as a simple temporal preference.  Helpfully, 
considerations of general societal efficiency are not accounted by a 
counting analysis.  This is useful in that opinions vary on what should be 
generally optimized ex ante.  Restated, an individual might have normative 
preferences for transitioning from the Existing Set while still trusting that 
there can be variability in the structures and processes that inhere in the 
New Set. 
More to the point for those whose normative preferences favor 
reduced greenhouse gas emissions, this blunt technological reductionism 
counsels strategic action in substitutions out of the Existing Set from the 
New Set (as discussed later).  Likewise, counting reveals that arguments 
dismissing the impact of local action are technologically unaware (i.e., 
 
65. Specific support for this view is found in the circumstance that the new 
technologies underpinning the convergence of the electricity and transport sectors are often 
shared.  For example, lithium-ion battery energy storage is used both for storing generated 
electricity and electric vehicle propulsion.   
66. See, e.g., PATHWAYS, supra note 7; see also IPCC Special Report, supra note 15 
(describing time constraints to achieving decarbonization). 
 




decarbonization is a global problem, and the world’s atmosphere is shared, 
therefore individual actions are comparatively unimportant).  The reason is 
again traceable to the Improvement Gap, together with the process of 
technological change that follows adoption including learning-by-doing at 
local levels.  Transitioning from the Existing Set to the New Set is seen 
through counting as a series of individual discrete steps each with global 
impact.  Rather than a hypothetical (or fanciful) perspective, this 
observation comports with existing empirical evidence: the Existing Set 
itself consists of only a handful of technological artifacts—some 
combination of coal, oil, gas, internal combustion engines, and steam 
turbines—that have predominated everywhere in the world. 
 
iv. Corrective to Continuity and Abstraction Biases  
 
Consider a counting approach against the White House Council on 
Environmental Quality proposal to require the considered effects of a 
proposed action to be “reasonably foreseeable” and require a “reasonably 
close causal relationship.”67  As counting has shown, the Improvement Gap 
is foreseeable, provided the problem of decarbonization is properly framed.  
Elements in the New Set have substantially greater practical and theoretical 
capacity for performance gains than do the corresponding elements of the 
Existing Set.  Analysis that ignores the effects of discrete changes because 
they seem inconsequential or lack a “reasonably close causal relationship” 
thereby unintentionally shorts a known process of technological adoption.68         
In a similar manner, counting provides a useful corrective to existing 
continuous analyses overly focused on the effects of emissions rather than 
discrete technological causes.69  For example, a counting approach is useful 
for countering Continuity Bias, the predominant heuristic for present 
decision-making.  Past actions or occurrences are largely not relevant to a 
counting analysis, except in observing certain technological artifacts being 
more or less numerous, and the effect such changes promise for further 
altering existing systems.  Prospective or contemporary discrete changes, 
which are trivial or uninteresting to marginal rate analysis, are treated as 
 
67. See WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY PROPOSAL, supra note 
3. 
68. A corollary perhaps is that we should not be overly sure of our ability to quantify 
severe qualitative risks.  See, e.g., Rosen & Guenther, supra, note 13 (describing, among 
other things, cost projection defects in integrated adaptation models that reduce incentive 
for policymakers to act). 
69. One of a handful of exceptions is the pioneering Carbon Tracker Initiative, which 
is concerned with, for example, the number of coal plants that must be replaced worldwide 
to meet a decarbonization goal. CARBON TRACKER INITIATIVE, https://perma.cc/Y3M3-
9UN9.  For a summary review of the development of those conceptual devices, see BEN 
CALDECOTT ET AL., SMITH SCH. ENTER. UNIV. OXFORD, STRANDED ASSETS AND SCENARIOS 
(2014), https://perma. cc/7KGM-PE8B.  
 




determinative in a counting approach due to scale and the Improvement 
Gap. 
A discrete perspective further allows a counting approach to avoid 
Abstraction Bias as no ex ante decisions on system efficiency need be 
assumed.  In this way counting illustrates that the purported necessity of, 
for example, colossal infrastructure programs or carbon taxes or otherwise, 
are merely expressions of specific normative preferences for how the New 
Set should evolve.  Even for proposals that are misguided, a counting 
approach is largely unaffected because the process of adoption is itself the 
proof.70  A counting approach works whether it is believed that 
decarbonization goals reflect speculation or are, in reality, vital to species 
survival.  Individuals and communities need not wait for resolution of these 
differing perspectives to make decisions leading to immediate reductions 
in greenhouse gas emissions. 
Counting is not claimed to always represent a useful methodology.  
The convergence of factors present in the problem of decarbonization may 
not be present for other matters of private and public choice.  Even in the 
context of decarbonization, an objection to this reductionist technological 
view is that individual and public choices may prove insufficiently robust 
to meet decarbonization goals.  For example, the New Set may not improve 
quickly enough through adoption, or achieve sufficient scale, to cause a 
change in the fundamental replacement calculus of the Existing Set.  
Meaning that if the technologies in the New Set are not demonstrably better 
by non-emissions metrics than the replacement of the Existing Set they 
might slow, or stall as social values are heterogenous.  At this time, that risk 
appears anti-empirical although its existence ensures continued debate of 
decarbonization within the larger polity, which is natural and appropriate.   
Nonetheless, despite limitations, counting reveals important insights 
that marginal (and statistical regression) methodologies do not.  Foremost, 
that decarbonization need not solely represent a collective action problem 
in the U.S.  Under a counting analysis, each individual or community 
decision to replace an element of the Existing Set is a vital step toward 
quickening the pace of improvement in the New Set and much more.  This 
understanding has specific strategic consequences as the following case 
study demonstrates.  Rather than divisive, it is claimed that the transparency 
provided by a counting approach is of net benefit in a democratically-
controlled, federalist, multi-jurisdictional set of nested regulatory 
 
70. If the Improvement Gap is correct, and past qualitative experience with 
technological adoption holds, then substitutions will result in decarbonization regardless of 
heterogenous preferences.  An exception is circumstances where individuals and localized 
preferences are frustrated by law and regulation.  See David J. Hess, Sustainability 
Transitions: A Political Coalition Perspective, 43 RSCH. POL’Y 278 (2014); see also Geels, 
supra note 53. 
 




processes, particularly where broad social consensus and control eludes 
those that most fervently seek it.    
 
III. Case Study of Counting for an Electric Utility 
 
Electricity procurement sits at the nexus of decarbonization because 
the electricity and transport sectors are converging and, together, account 
for most greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S.  In most industrialized 
countries, including the U.S., electricity is still predominantly delivered by 
and through electric utilities.  Any strategic plan for addressing 
decarbonization is therefore likely to run through, or around, a local electric 
utility.  The following case study explores the contours of decarbonization 
through an evaluation of one specific utility.   
 
A.  A Pernicious Technical Myth about Electricity 
 
Before proceeding, a technical detail should be cleared. Perhaps the 
most pernicious technical myth about electricity delivery in the U.S. is that 
the power grids infrastructure is an enormous seamless, synchronous 
machine, with demand load balanced against supply as electrons seamlessly 
move throughout the country to where they are needed.  This is a powerful, 
evocative, and fundamentally inaccurate description of domestic electricity 
procurement.  Like many simplified stories, this vision carries elements of 
truth as supply of electricity must indeed be tightly balanced with load 
demand and electrons certainly move fast.   
One issue amiss in grand visions of a national or even broad regional 
“integrated” grid is a bit of commonsense: alternate current electricity is not 
a good long-distance traveler, and in the U.S., nominal operating line losses 
are between eight percent and fifteen percent.71  (Direct current 
transmission and other re-engineered solutions have problems too, chiefly 
cost and dynamic management.72)  The problem of line losses worsens 
depending on various factors, including additional distance and heat.  At 
very long distances, practical voltages cannot overcome line resistance at 
all, although well before that point, increasing line losses, the need for 
 
71. See generally, J.C. MOLBURG ET AL., ARGONNE NAT’L LAB’Y, THE DESIGN, 
CONSTRUCTION, AND OPERATION OF LONG-DISTANCE HIGH-VOLTAGE ELECTRICITY 
TRANSMISSION TECHNOLOGIES (2007) [hereinafter MOLBURG]; see also BOOTH & ASSOCS., 
DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM LOSS REDUCTION MANUAL (1983).  In countries with less developed 
infrastructure, the percentage losses may be multiples higher; see, e.g., Michael C. 
Anumaka, Analysis of Technical Losses in Electrical Power System (Nigerian 330KV 
Network as a Case Study), 12 INT’L J. RELIABILITY, RISK & SAFETY 320 (2012) (noting 
transmission losses in the Nigerian grid of up to 40 percent). 
72. See, e.g., MOLBURG, supra note 71, at 50. 
 




synchronicity between generators, and other factors constrain the economic 
distance for the transmission of alternating current.73   
This limitation of alternating current electricity grids highlights an 
important reality: substituting a single node of electricity consumption 
results in more pronounced localized effects to the surrounding power grid, 
all other things equal.  The conclusion is bolstered by the balkanized 
physical and operational architecture of the U.S. electricity infrastructure.74  
It is further supported by the observation that centralized electricity 
networks (unlike communications networks) are not strictly necessary for 
the procurement of electricity, a conclusion that has been empirically 
demonstrated.75   
With that technical understanding in mind a simplified counting 
analysis of an electric utility can be introduced.  The following discussion 
concerns a governmental-owned utility although the procession of analysis 
would work the same for any investor-owned electric utility, with 
reasonable adjustment.  
 
B. Tennessee Valley Authority 
 
The Tennessee Valley Authority (“TVA”) is a corporate agency and 
instrumentality of the U.S. government.76  It was initially considered a gem 
in the regulatory crown of the New Deal although its evolution into a 
government-owned electric utility and comparatively little more may hold 
 
73. Perhaps 300 to 350 miles, subject to various factors, although line losses increase 
incrementally with distance due to impedance. 
74. As one example, the North American electricity system is made up for four grids, 
or interconnections, West, East, Texas (ERCOT), and Quebec. These interconnections are 
not synchronized, meaning that the sine waves of alternating current are not in phase, so the 
grids cannot share electricity, except through limited and few direct current connections.  
75. See WOODMAC DISTRIBUTED SOLAR REPORT, supra note 57.  See generally Trahan, 
Regulating, supra note 13, at 1113, 16–19. Electricity networks do not generate positive 
networked effects, as additional users do not make the economic good of electricity more 
valuable to users on the network.  For illustration of the concept, contrast electricity with 
communication technologies: your phone is more valuable if other folks have one too; 
whether your neighbor is on the power grid or off does not affect the value of the electricity 
that you consume.  The lack of positive networked effects imply that a solely centralized 
electricity grid is not a technical requirement of electricity procurement. Meanwhile security 
hazards do exhibit non-linear growth in a centralized electricity delivery system as 
additional users join the network.  Compare Metcalfe’s Law, the rubric named for and 
popularized by Robert Melancton “Bob” Metcalfe, where the value of a telecommunications 
network is proportional to the square of the number of connected users of the system.  
Alternately, the community value of a network grows as the square of the number of its users 
increases. In both instances, the primary value questions are how many users does the 
network provide access to and interaction with. Such value propositions are inapposite for 
electricity as a good. 
76. See generally Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, 16 U.S.C. § 831 (2012). 
 




lessons for New Green Deal proposals.77  By provision of federal statute 
TVA has a monopoly in its service area, which covers a population of 
nearly 10 million over parts of seven states.78  
 
i. Legal Constraints and Board Composition 
 
Similar to other electric utilities, a primary challenge facing TVA is 
determining which technologies to select to procure future electricity 
generation.  A requirement in its organic statute, the Tennessee Valley 
Authority Act, sets parameters on that decision-making process, requiring 
TVA to:   
 
. . . employ and implement a planning and selection process 
for new energy resources which evaluates the full range of 
existing and incremental resources (including new power 
supplies, energy conservation and efficiency, and renewable 
energy resources) in order to provide adequate and reliable service 
to electric customers of the Tennessee Valley Authority at the 
lowest system cost.79   
 
Assume for present purposes, as TVA does, that this statutory 
language represents a simple command to provide electricity at the lowest 
system cost possible.80  This interpretation is traceable to TVA’s 
anachronistic mission to use federal support to promote economic 
development in the Tennessee Valley.81  In essence, the argument is if 
commerce thrives on energy, then delivering cheap electricity promotes 
commerce.  A key consideration, however, one that was introduced in the 
discussion of the issue of Continuity Bias, is determining what temporal 
period should be optimized.  In a rapidly changing technological landscape, 
cheap today does not imply cheap tomorrow.  The discussion of the issue 
of Abstraction Bias meanwhile presages an inquiry of whether TVA is an 
 
77. See ERWIN HARGROVE, PRISONERS OF MYTH—LEADERSHIP OF THE TENNESSEE 
VALLEY AUTHORITY 1933 TO 1990 20–22, 122–125 (1994) [hereinafter HARGROVE] 
(detailing the original grassroots mission of TVA to bring technological tools to the people, 
and the resulting evolution into a large power company monopoly).  See generally PHILIP 
SELZNICK, TVA AND THE GRASS ROOTS; A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF FORMAL 
ORGANIZATION (1949) [hereinafter SELZNICK]. 
78.  See Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C.  § 824k(j) (2012). 
79.  16 U.S.C. § 831m–1(b)(1).  
80.  See U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY 10-K FILING 
11 (2018), https://perma.cc/42HB-39KQ [hereinafter 2018 TVA 10-K].  See also U.S. SEC. 
& EXCHANGE COMM’N, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY 10-K FILING 47 (2019), 
https://perma.cc/65R2-MW9V [hereinafter 2019 TVA 10-K].  
81. Id. at 21. 
 




effective organizational structure for procuring all or most electricity in the 
Tennessee Valley.  
For now note that TVA has not been adept at meeting its lowest cost 
mission for residential and small commercial customers.82  Smaller 
customers subsidize large industrial users of electricity within the TVA 
service area, paying electricity rates roughly two to three times higher, a 
percentage that has been increasing in recent years.83  That discrepancy in 
pricing is the prerogative of the TVA Board of Directors, who are provided 
the sole authority and responsibility for establishing electricity rates under 
the TVA Act.84 
 
ii. Financial Position 
 
As an instrumentality of the U.S. government, TVA enjoys the 
implicit guarantee of the federal government which underpins its AAA 
credit rating (by Fitch), far higher than for investor-owned U.S. electric 
utilities.85  Indeed, TVA acknowledges that its high credit rating would not 
be warranted without implicit governmental guarantee.86  Although TVA is 
subsidized by the federal government in various ways,87 its capital funding 
is wholly dependent on private debt placements.88  Governmental support 
allows TVA to carry a high degree of financial leverage.89 
The Governmental Accountability Office (“GAO”) had previously 
found TVA’s financial leverage to be of concern in an investigative report 
 
82. See Melissa Whited & Tim Woolf, Electricity Prices in the Tennessee Valley: Are 
Customers Being Treated Fairly?, SYNAPSE ENERGY ECON. INC. 1 (Jan. 31, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/2E75-2SYA.  
83. Id. 
84. 16 U.S.C. § 831a(g)(L) (2012).  The Board consists of up to nine members, serving 
staggered five-year terms; appointment is by the President of the United States with 
confirmation required by the U.S. Senate. 16 U.S.C. §§ 831a(a)(1), 831a(d).  
85. See Credit Ratings, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY (last visited Sept. 23, 2020, 
8:30 AM), https://perma.cc/6MEE-YX9L.  
86. See 2018 TVA 10-K, supra note 80, at 37 (“TVA’s current credit ratings are not 
based solely on its underlying business or financial condition but are based to a large extent 
on the legislation that defines TVA’s business structure [including] . . . TVA’s status as a 
corporate agency and instrumentality of the U.S.”); see also 2019 TVA 10-K, supra note 
80, at 37. 
87. Among the many benefits is a $150 million credit facility with the United States 
Department of the Treasury.  See 2019 TVA 10-K, supra note 80, at 110.   
88. The cap on private debt placements is $30 billion. See 16 U.S.C. § 831n-4(a) (2012); 
see also Tennessee Valley Authority, FY 2020 Budget Proposal & Management Agenda and 
FY 2018 Performance Report, TENN. VALLEY AUTHORITY 10 (March 18, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/A2UU-JCAL [hereinafter 2020 TVA Budget].  
89. In its 2020 budget proposal to Congress, TVA reported total financing obligations 
of $24.3 billion, with billions more in future obligations continuing to accrue.  See id. at 31.   
 




on its finances delivered in 2017.90  TVA responded to the report by 
promising to reduce its debt obligations over several years by increasing 
consumer electricity rates, limiting the growth of operating expenses, and 
reducing capital expenditures.91  TVA thereafter seemingly enjoyed limited 
success in reducing long-term debt,92 although its broader financial picture 
deteriorated.  For example, absent from TVA’s response to the GAO report 
was agreement to fund its pension obligations at a higher rate.93  Compared 
to typical levels set by large investor-owned utilities, TVA substantially 
underfunds its pension obligations, a problem that is worsening.94  Another 
example is seen in TVA’s asset retirement obligations which have grown 
by a factor of three, approximately $3.6 billion, since 2005.95   
Electricity sales and financings furnish essentially all of TVA’s 
revenue and are therefore vital for repaying its private bond holders.96  This 
circumstance explains TVA’s practice of “capacity capture.”  Capacity 
capture is a method by which electric utilities overbuild generation capacity 
and infrastructure for future demand and then charge those investments to 
consumers over time through incremental increases in electricity prices.97   
 
90.    U. S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY: ACTIONS 
NEEDED TO BETTER COMMUNICATE DEBT REDUCTION PLANS AND ADDRESS BILLIONS IN 
UNFUNDED PENSION LIABILITIES (Mar. 2017), https://per ma.cc/QM4F-GUCE [hereinafter 
GAO Report]. 
91. Id. at 1. 
92.    Long-term debt was reduced by about 4% from the end of fiscal-year 2016 to the 
end of fiscal-year 2018.  
93.    See GAO Report, supra note 90, at 1; see 2019 TVA 10-K, supra note 80, at 66; 
see also 2018 TVA 10-K, supra note 80, at 125–28. 
94.   Typical investor-owned utilities fund pension obligations at a rate of between 85 
percent and over 100 percent.  See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER MUIR AND SHANG YANG CHUAH, 
CFRA (S&P GLOBAL), INDUSTRY SURVEYS, ELECTRIC UTILITIES at 26 (Aug. 2018); TVA’s 
funding rate of fifty-nine percent as of the end of fiscal-year 2019 implies a funding gap of 
approximately $3.3 billion to reach the low-end of electric utility industry standards (the gap 
increased from $2 billion in 2018).  See 2019 TVA 10-K, supra note 80, at 66.  See also 
2018 TVA 10-K, supra note 80, at 37, 125.   
95. See U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY 10-K 
FILINGS 2005–2019. (Estimates of future obligations necessary to retire, primarily, power 
plants from service.  At present, approximately $5.453 billion compared to $1.8 billion in 
2005, and not yet reflected in TVA’s total financing obligations.) See 2019 TVA 10-K, supra 
note 80, at 151; 2006 TVA 10-K at 140 (the 2005 10-K was not immediately available, 
although the 2006 10-K provides prior year information).  
96.   2019 TVA 10-K, supra note 80, at 8.  
        97.   Capacity capture relies on a cost recovery mechanism known as “rate basing,” a 
term which I tried to avoid so as not to confuse the other discussion of rates. Assets are 
overbuilt due to construction time constraints and other practical factors and, today, to 
preclude competition.  Due to the progress of technological substitutes, it is suggested that 
the concept of capacity capture is distinct from the Averch–Johnson effect, which postulates 
that the reduced cost of capital available to regulated utilities will incentivize utilities to 
over-accumulate and over-deploy capital as subsidizing risk interferes with profit-
 
 




There are sensible historical reasons, technical and otherwise, for 
financing huge single-asset capital expenditures in a similar way, although 
a modern effect of capacity capture is to foreclose competition from New 
Set technologies.  Consumers ultimately hold the risk of capital deployed 
for new generation assets and, once financially leveraged, are linked to a 
specific technological pathway; a similar and stronger analysis applies to 




TVA reports that it produces more than one out of every 100 pounds 
of carbon dioxide emitted in the U.S. from all sources, ~ 52 million metric 
tons annually.98  An independent count observes that TVA substantially 
undercounts its carbon dioxide emissions by around 10 percent, or 5 million 
metric tons annually.99  In step with other electric utilities, TVA focuses on 
rates of emissions efficiency and reports an annual average figure.  For 
example, in 2018 TVA reported an emissions rate of 825.09 pounds of 
carbon dioxide per megawatt hour of generation measured over the 
timescale of a calendar year.100   
A marginal analysis, by contrast, would measure change at the margin 
of the relationship between emissions and generation at a past instant or 
forecast the same for a future instant, e.g., incremental generation deployed 
to meet demand.  A marginal rate of emissions is the pace at which such 
 
maximizing decisions to seek equality between the marginal product of the inputs and the 
ratio of costs.  See Harvey Averch & Leland Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under 
Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052 (1962). 
98.   Total U.S. carbon dioxide emissions are calculated at around 5.1 billion metric 
tons.  See, e.g., U.S. Energy-Related CO2 Emissions Increased in 2018 but Will Likely Fall 
in 2019 and 2020, U.S. ENERGY INFO.  ADMIN.: TODAY IN ENERGY (Jan. 28, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/2GF2-DDWN. Compare EUR. COMM’N, JOINT RES. CTR., FOSSIL CO2 
EMISSIONS OF ALL WORLD COUNTRIES (2018), https://perma.cc/D624-CSTK.  For an 
explanation of land sinks in the determination, see ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, INVENTORY 
OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS 1990-2017 (Apr. 11, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/3A6X-6L3T.  Using TVA’s reported emissions for 2018 yields, 
52,252,375/~5,100,000,000 = 1.02 percent.  Properly counted, TVA’s emissions are higher, 
see infra, note 107. 
99.    See Form EIA-923 Detailed Data, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (2018) [hereinafter 
EIA 2018].  
100.    See, Carbon Dioxide, TENN. VALLEY AUTHORITY (last visited Sept. 23, 2020, 
9:33 AM), https://perma.cc/37LC-QR2Z [hereinafter TVA CO2 Report]. 
 




changes occur, are expected to occur.101  As discussed, Continuity Bias in 
marginal rate analysis reflects an assumption that the underlying 
relationships, here generation and emissions, are reasonably stable—not 
constant necessarily, just staying on the curve. Employing a rate 
calculation, average or marginal, is then a comprehensible effort to tie 
electric generation output together with emissions, to provide a measure of 
the efficiency with which electrical generation is produced over some 
temporal period.  Such metrics are easily recognized and inhered to adjust 
for the size of disparate generation portfolios, giving the appearance of 
consistency. 
For legacy electric utilities a rate of emissions offers optical benefits.  
TVA, for example, ranks among the leading global emitters of carbon 
dioxide over its eighty-five-year history.  Focusing on a rate of emissions 
avoids discussion of sunk costs—and normative entanglements—
concerning proportionate shares of historic and modern world carbon 
stocks.  A further justification for viewing emissions from a rate perspective 
is that electricity generation is generally viewed favorably and desired to 
continue into the future, unlike an activity that may have been deemed to 
have no material social benefit, e.g., tobacco.102 
Yet, the earth’s atmosphere is largely a closed and finite system, thus 
emissions performance goals are net measurements of magnitude due to 
cumulative impact.  As described in the discussion of the issue of 
Abstraction Bias, dividing the amount of bad (emissions) by good 
(generation) is a fundamentally flawed metric of electric utility 
performance.  Adjusting that average rate would require incremental 
(marginal) change in TVA’s emissions or its generation, as those variables 
relate to one another.  Such metrics would not directly measure energy 
conservation or efficiency, or alternate approaches to electricity 
procurement—e.g., distributed generation or storage—that do not 
 
101.    It is a concern du jour that policy decisions regarding decarbonization might be 
made by relying on measurements of average carbon emissions, e.g., the amount of carbon 
emitted over some time period for a portfolio of electricity power plants.  As one example, 
the Rocky Mountain Institute recently produced a primer cautioning commentators against 
relying on average rates of emissions noting that such metrics fail to account for change at 
the margin, the incremental adjustment from existing conditions.  See On the Importance of 
Marginal Emissions Factors for Policy Analysis, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST. (WITH 
WATTTIME) (2018), https://per ma.cc/K7GY-32Z5. This is a useful reminder; however, it 
carries special methodological danger in times of abrupt technological change and is 
susceptible to assumptions of the social purpose for which it is applied.  
102.    Coincidentally, recent investment commentary has explicitly compared the use 
of fossil fuels to tobacco. See, e.g., Jim Cramer, Mad Money (CNBC television broadcast 
Jan. 31, 2020), https://perma.cc/46MD-GKMB (stating that a trend of divestment of stock 
shares of oil and gas companies is a “death knell” reflecting the sentiment that these 
companies “are the new tobacco”). 
 




presuppose that TVA is necessary to electricity procurement. In brief: 
differential rates cannot measure what is not there.    
Applying a performance metric to TVA’s aggregate emissions is 
instead necessary to contextualize its performance.   A science-based 
aggregate measure from the Deep Decarbonization Pathways (“DDP”) is 
applied here for familiarity.103  Per this DDP standard, emitters need to 
reduce carbon dioxide emissions by eighty percent prior to 2050, measured 
from a base year of 1990, to limit certain projected catastrophic effects of 
climate change (80/2050 Goal).104 
For the calendar year 1990, TVA reported consumption of electricity 
prime movers (coal, gas, diesel fuels) implying carbon dioxide emissions 
of approximately 84 million tons.105  In order to achieve the 80/2050 Goal, 
TVA then needs to reduce its annual carbon dioxide emissions by 67 
million tons, or an emissions ceiling of around 17 million tons annually by 
2050.106  If it emits more, it fails the target.107  This is separate explanation 
for the limited usefulness of differential efficiency rates, average or 
marginal in this context: irrespective of whether the rate is 825lbs/MWh 
per some time scale, half that, or any non-zero number, such rates are only 
relatable to goals of magnitude if integrated with consumption.108  The 
guiding principle of integration is relevant here as it does not matter how 
fast you hit the wall if hitting the wall will kill you. 
Not all electric utilities undercount carbon dioxide emissions, but it is 
frequent practice to omit additional analytic steps that would tie rates of 
emissions to consumption and net performance standards. This undermines 
policymakers’ ability to make basic assessments, e.g., whether an electric 
 
103.    PATHWAYS, supra note 7, at 5. 
104.    Id.  
105.    Historic Form EIA-906 Detailed Data with Previous Form Data (EIA-759), U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (1990). TVA itself does not provide an emissions estimate for 1990, 
its provided calculations only go back to 1995.  See TVA CO2 Report, supra note 101. 
Annual data sets from four, post-1994 years were sampled with the same methodology and 
the differences between the results and TVA’s reporting varied by up to a maximum of less 
than two percent.  Only power plants that TVA owned were used for this purpose, but see 
supra note 100. 
106.    Eighty percent and twenty percent, respectively, of eighty-four million. 
107.   This would likely be viewed as overconservative for ignoring time value of 
emissions, not accounting for future Scope 2 emissions reclassification, and providing no 
margin or bulwark for unexpected outcomes.  See generally Rosen & Guenther, supra note 
13. 
108.    The mathematical processes can be reversed of course but the immediate point 
is that, in practice, electric utilities do not do so. As discussed, even a practice of integration 
leads to confused analysis when applied to the avoidance of consumption via energy 
efficiency and other variables situated outside its division. 
 




utility’s improved emissions performance is adequate.109  Obtaining 
satisfactory information may depend on fixing data misconstructions and 
analytical omissions, an informational role that might be immediately filled 
by a private institution.110 
 




TVA serves a nearly ten-million person service-area and produces 
more than one out of every 100 pounds of carbon dioxide emissions in the 
U.S., yet it only owns twenty-three fossil fuel sites (with many locations 
having multiple generating units, Kingston Fossil Plant, for example, has 
nine).111  TVA is expected to retire one of its five remaining coal plants 
(Bull Run), with decommissioning planned for December 2023, leaving 
twenty-two fossil fuel sites without assigned retirement dates.  This is 




Figure 2: Carbon Emissions by Source in 2018 
 
109.    Historic emissions reductions at TVA, for example, are largely attributable to 
decreases in consumption from, e.g., the adoption of LED lightbulbs, along with the 
substitution of natural gas generation for coal, along with increased nuclear generation. 
110.    Establishing a third-party database, inclusive of each individual electric utility 
and their respective plants, could integrate consumption and provide a view of its likely 
future trajectory, the latter of which would be fixed to the end date of an emissions 
framework, like the DDP.  The projection of growth—the increase in the independent 
variable of future consumption—could further be bracketed within reasonable bounds or 
subjected to multiple case analysis.  Such an approach is especially appropriate in the special 
case of electricity as it is, as a good, regulated toward universal access at a socially 
acceptable price. 
111.    See EIA 2018, supra note 99. 
112.    Id.  
 





A coincident and well-known technological story is that coal, as a 
prime mover of electricity generation, is today grossly uneconomic in the 
U.S., even without the existence of a carbon tax.  Ignoring production 
methane releases, natural gas is much cleaner than coal, emitting roughly 
forty-three percent fewer pounds of carbon dioxide than bituminous coal, 
per equivalent British thermal unit.  As such, it is reasonable to ask how 
much natural gas production could persist concurrent with TVA achieving 
the 80/2050 Goal for annual emissions? 
 
 
Table 1: Natural Gas and Annual Generation in 2018  
 
Table 1 shows that—assuming all other fossil fuel generation of TVA 
is retired—no more than three TWh of additional new natural gas 
generation could be brought into the TVA system and still meet the 80/2050 
Goal.113  In 2018, coal generation accounted for approximately thirty TWh 
of electricity in the TVA system.  This means that approximately ninety 
percent of existing coal-powered generation cannot be substituted with 
natural gas.  The noteworthy corollary is that even a very lax emissions 
reduction goal could not result in a majority replacement of coal generation 
with natural gas. 
The foregoing provides specific illustration of the issue of Continuity 
Bias in analyses that recommend the replacement of coal with natural gas 
due to the marginal improvement in emissions performance.  Specifically, 
substantial incremental substitutions of natural gas for coal would 
consistently signal efficiency improvements, yet such substitutions would 
simultaneously ingrain a technological pathway that ensures failure to reach 
the 80/2050 Goal.  The misconstruction of efficiency here carries extra 
meaning as TVA has stated that the capacity of its generating portfolio is 
sufficient to meet demand for the next few years without capital 
expenditures on new power plants.114  As such, there is a lull in the 
 
113.    There are a number of ways to obtain the product, all which yield the same result.  
For quick simplicity, assume that the rate of carbon dioxide emissions per GWh of natural 
gas generation is the same as it was in 2018, roughly .4035 carbon dioxide metric tons/GWh. 
Applying that rate to thirty-nine terawatt hours would thereby result in a product of roughly 
15.726 million metric tons of carbon dioxide emissions.  See 2019 TVA 10-K, supra note 
81; EIA 2018, supra note 100. 
114.    See 2018 TVA 10-K, supra note 87, at 61.  See also Integrated Resource Plan: 
Volume I Final Resource Plan, TENN. VALLEY AUTHORITY 4-11–4-13 (2019), 
 
 




deployment of new generation.  The minimal additional consumption 
available to be met by natural gas is therefore tied to coal plant retirements 
in the interim, regardless of emissions.115  This simplified picture does not 
account for, among other things, financial considerations in deploying 
additional natural gas generation which increase the risk of any further plant 
construction.116  The foregoing has, in sum, defined TVA’s Existing Set 
within the parameters of 80/2050 Goal; prior to 2050, TVA must: (i) retire 
all of its coal power plants; (ii) replace no more than approximately ten 
percent of coal generation with natural gas; and (iii) approximately ninety 
percent of existing coal plant generation must be replaced with technologies 
from the New Set, which does not include natural gas.   
 Note that this analysis omits consumption growth.  Even an 
assumption of nominal growth carries material impact.  Recent EIA 
projections forecast an approximate one percent growth rate for electricity 
consumption in the TVA service area.117  Even substantially rounding down 
that forecast to an annual increase of 0.75 percent implies a need for more 
than thirty-eight TWh of additional generation by the year 2050 as 
compared to 2018, or more than current generation from either coal or 
natural gas.118  Further delimiting the above 80/2050 solution for TVA, all 
 
https://perma.cc/TX23-EL93 [hereinafter 2019 TVA IRP].  TVA spends roughly two 
hundred million per year in scattered capacity investments, but this is an order of magnitude 
(plus a few times) lower than a major new generation investment in, e.g., a new nuclear 
reactor. 
115.    This ignores the problem of time value of emissions and does not account for 
the necessity of continued reductions after 2050. 
116.   Natural gas power plants historically require a minimum twenty-five-year 
operating schedule to recoup initial investment at a rate of return justifying investment risk.  
See, e.g., GE Cautionary Tale, supra note 121, at 6.  A natural gas plant completed before 
2024 may fully amortize, even including a twelve-month decommission allowance, but after 
2026 the standard amortization schedule is cut short.  If a natural gas plant cannot continue 
to economically operate past 2050 there is a mismatch between operating life and the 
schedule of amortizing debt payments. For example, losing one year of a twenty-five-year 
amortization schedule represents only a four percent change in time duration.  But by 2030, 
five years of amortization would have been lost, a twenty percent change in duration, 
resulting in significantly higher service payments, a similar cost effect to substituting thirty, 
twenty, and fifteen-year mortgage terms, although the operational risks of the power plant 
in an emissions-reduction regulatory environment are just one of many problematic 
variables. 
117.   Annual Energy Outlook 2019, with Projections to 2050, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN. (Jan. 24, 2019), https://perma.cc/JA3T-LP9B.  The EIA reference case assumptions 
on electric car adoption already are in need of considerable upward revision.  It should be 
generally noted that electricity demand growth forecasts, from the EIA and others, have not 
been particularly accurate in the past.  See, e.g., Michael Wara et al., Peak Electricity and 
the Clean Power Plan, 4 Electr. J. 1 (2015), https://perma.cc/AQU4-HL4A. 
118. In 2018, TVA-owned plants generated approximately 143 TWh of electricity 
generation.  Applying a nominal three-quarters annual increase in demand results in 
consumption growing by over thirty percent to 2050. 
 




future consumption growth in would need to be met by technologies from 
the New Set. 
 
(1) Existing Set—Individual Artifacts 
 
A counting analysis describes the correspondence between the 
Existing Set and the New Set at the set level and also at the level of 
individual technological artifacts.  The above discussion delimits the set 
level correspondence between the technologies of the Existing Set (coal, 
diesel, and natural gas) and those in the New Set (solar, wind, battery 
energy storage, energy efficiency or conservation).  The next step is to 
evaluate an individual technological artifact.  By way of example, the 




Table 2: TVA’s Largest Fossil Power Plants  
 
119. See EIA 2018, supra note 99. 
 





Consider the sixth largest fossil plant by net generation, John Sevier.  
In 2018, the John Sevier plant generated approximately 4.786 TWh of 
electricity, with generation split approximately 1/3 steam and 2/3 
combustion.120  For purposes of illustration, assume for now that John 
Sevier uses all of its generation to supply residential homes, rather than the 
supply of some amount of industrial steam.  For purposes of simplicity, 
further stipulate that a single residential home consumes 12,000 kWh of 
electricity per year.   John Sevier could thus supply 391,667 homes. 
Which homes?  Specifically, in evaluating the New Set options for 
substitution which homes might obtain electricity from a new technology 
if the desire were to replace John Sevier?  The John Sevier plant is located 
in the Eastern part of Tennessee, approximately 400 miles from Memphis.   
As such, decarbonization actions taken by Memphians are not likely 
to directly impact the operation of the plant.121  John Sevier instead delivers 
its power at more economic distances, primarily to the nearby towns of 
Johnson City, Knoxville, the Oak Ridge Facility, and perhaps, as a 
supplement, to the cities of Chattanooga and Nashville.122  Memphians have 
power plants of their own, of course, including the Allen Fossil Plant, which 
is located in Memphis, 7 miles from Graceland.123 
 To introduce further necessary detail, the activities of power 
generation, transmission, and distribution in the U.S. are often handled by 
different entities.  Except for fifty-two industrial customers and six federal 
installations,124 TVA does not deliver power directly to customers and 
instead relies on contracts with 154 municipal and cooperative distributers 
of electricity.125  As such, substitutions from the Existing Set in Johnson 
City and Knoxville would result in more pronounced impacts to the 
performance of John Sevier and also the local power company (Knoxville 
Utilities Board) that distributes electricity generated by TVA.  
Reducing the performance of John Sevier is an economic problem for 
TVA, but a potential boon to Knoxville Utilities Board as many residential 
customers are likely to continue paying for access to the distribution grid 
(back up energy) regardless of the presence of, e.g., rooftop solar.  This 
divergence provides partial explanation for current calls for municipalities 
 
120. See EIA 2018, supra note 99. 
121. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
122. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
123. See EIA 2018, supra note 99. 
124. These direct customers compromise roughly eight percent of TVA’s revenues. See 
TENNESSEE VALLEY INDUSTRIAL COMMITTEE, https://perma.cc/ 6LV7-PARK (last visited 
Oct. 2, 2020); see also Public Power for the Valley, TENN. VALLEY AUTHORITY, 
https://perma.cc/ST4A-2S6U (last visited Sept. 23, 2020, 2:13 PM). 
125. See 2019 TVA 10-K, supra 80, at 16.  
 




and cooperatives to defect from the TVA system to realize the economic 
and environmental benefits of technological progress.126 
This circumstance also provides reasoned explanation for the 
economic incentive for corporate renewable purchases: quasi-defecting 
from a legacy electric system while retaining the benefits of the system 
through private long-term contract.127  The recent trend of decreased prices 
for rooftop solar, or at another level, the phase out of natural gas peaker 
plants in favor of battery energy storage deployments, are examples of 
technological system risk.128  TVA well understands the risk of defection 
as noted in its latest 10-K filing: 
 
TVA also faces competition in the form of emerging 
technologies. Improvements in energy efficiency technologies, 
smart technologies, and energy storage technologies may reduce 
the demand for centrally provided power. The growing interest by 
customers in generating their own power through [distributed 
generation] has the potential to lead to a reduction in the load 
served by TVA as well as cause TVA to re-evaluate how it 
operates the overall grid system to continue to provide highly 
reliable power at affordable rates.129 
 
 
126. See, e.g., Jurgen Weiss et al., Power to Memphis: Options for a Reliable, 
Affordable, and Greener Future, BRATTLE GROUP 16 (Jan. 2019), https://perm a.cc/NHV2-
4VB8 [hereinafter BRATTLE, Memphis Defection] (suggesting that Memphis Light, Gas & 
Water, a local power company that contracts for wholesale electricity from TVA, should 
exit the TVA system to save $240 to $333 million per year on electricity costs).  
        127. A corporate data center would not actually defect, of course, as those facilities no 
more run on the renewable generation power plants that are constructed at their behest than 
do smelters.  Rather, the corporate renewable buyer would obtain access to an entire, 
balanced electricity system while locking in favorable long-term electricity rates through 
private contracting. 
128. As a somewhat ironic callback to the GE Cautionary Tale, supra note 121, see 
Charles Newbery, Energy Storage Poses a Growing Threat to Peaker Plants, TRANSFORM 
(Oct. 1, 2018), https://perma.cc/P4ZM-X9T6.  As a specific example, see also CAL. ST. PUB. 
UTIL. COMM’N., RESOLUTION E-4949 (Nov. 8, 2018), https://perma.cc/V7YL-PEW7 
(approving the replacement of three natural gas peaker plants with battery energy storage). 
129. 2019 TVA 10-K, supra note 80, at 20. TVA first acknowledged the risk of 
customer defection due to distributed technologies in its 2018 10-K. See U.S. SEC. & 
EXCHANGE COMM’N, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY 10-K FILING 2013–2018. In its 2011 
and 2012 10-K filings, TVA warned its creditors that energy efficiency programs might 
experience insufficient adoption. As a new nuclear reactor, Watts Bar II, came closer to 
being brought online those warnings turned opposite, and began describing efficiency 
programs as a threat.  Either set of warnings reflect an incongruency between standard 
corporate concerns and social outcomes.   
 




TVA’s acknowledgment that emerging technologies are a threat, 
rather than a benefit, to its “business” is informative.130  By evaluating the 
individual elements of the Existing Set a counting analysis highlights that 
defections in Knoxville and Johnson City are indeed a problem for TVA 
generally, but more specifically problematic for the performance (and 
amortization) of the John Sevier plant.  This is a localized effect of a 
decarbonization action.  
TVA has a carbon footprint representing one out of every 100 pounds 
of carbon dioxide emissions in the U.S. from all sources.131  It is challenged 
by financial constraints, including debt load, an underfunded pension 
account, and growing asset retirement obligations.132  Despite federal 
subsidies, TVA’s financial position is ultimately dependent on private 
bond-holders who supply debt for operations and investment.133  Further, 
virtually all of TVA’s revenues result from electricity sales—which, 
coupled with its practice of capacity capture, put it in conflict with energy 
efficiency and conservation, distributed generation, and other “emerging 
technologies.”134   
Exacerbating the problem, TVA’s organizational structure and power 
system (Existing Set) are geared to legacy assets that are not susceptible to 
material improvements in practical or theoretical efficiency.135  This 
circumstance is among the reasons that calls have become more frequent 
for municipal and cooperative distributers to defect from the TVA system 
so as to save money by deploying newer, cleaner, more cost-resilient 





130. This highlights a disconnect between electric utility optimization and social 
benefit analysis. The divergence is even more clearly seen by contrasting TVA’s creditor 
disclosures with the messaging it provides the general public, viz. in its Integrated Resource 
Plan planning process that details future plans for electricity procurement and generation.  
The Integrated Resource Plan contradictorily claims TVA’s strong commitment to 
conservation and energy efficiency, and to distributed renewable generation.  See 2019 TVA 
IRP, supra note 114, at 4–13. Energy efficiency and conservation programs have the effect 
of reducing the sale of kilowatt hours, i.e., reducing vital revenues, as do distributed 
electricity procurement technologies, which may imperil TVA’s debt repayments. 
131. See Paul A. David, Path Dependence, Its Critics and the Quest for “Historical 
Economics”, ALL SOULS COLLEGE, OXFORD AND STANFORD UNIVERSITY, WORKING PAPER 
(2000). 
132. See 2020 TVA Budget, supra note 88. 
133. Id. 
134. See 2019 TVA 10-K, supra note 80. 
135. See discussion supra Part III.B.ii. 
136. See BRATTLE, Memphis Defection, supra note 126. 
 




(2) New Set, Improvement Gap 
 
The next step of analysis is to gauge the strategic effect of a discrete 
substitution out of the Existing Set from the New Set.  Here, this is 
necessarily a generalized exercise as a detailed counting analysis is well 
beyond the scope of this article.  Instead, the following highlights certain 
general touchstones of a counting approach.   
As discussed, a counting analysis is the expression of a normative 
preference for decarbonization.  Here, it might present as an individual or 
community preference for fewer greenhouse gas emissions, sooner.  Such 
a preference diverges in material respects from TVA’s expressed 
institutional predilections, and it is likely to differ from the preferences of 
many other individuals in the Tennessee Valley.  TVA is a monopoly and 
social consensus has proven difficult to reach; what actions can be taken?   
First, consider what a counting analysis avoids.  Counting circumvents 
arguments flowing from the issue of Continuity Bias as it is necessarily 
forward-looking.  In the context of TVA, this aspect of a counting analysis 
recognizes that marginal improvements in emissions efficiency metrics do 
not represent progress toward goals of decarbonization and instead augur 
failure.   
For example, TVA contends that natural gas deployments in substitute 
of coal generation are a sound method of energy transition due to the 
relatively cleaner emissions profile of natural gas.  A counting analysis 
reveals that material deployments of natural gas will lock-in a level of 
greenhouse gas emissions incompatible with goals of decarbonization.    
Counting further avoids arguments of system efficiency inherent in 
Abstraction Bias.  An approach based on counting does not assume ex ante 
that TVA is a necessary or useful organization structure for managing all 
or most of the technologies in the New Set.  It is further not accepted on 
faith that the specific correspondence of non-injective substitutions 
between the Existing Set and New Set are known in advance.  This aspect 
of a counting analysis highlights the power of individual choice, 
community action, and other discrete directed actions.  
Meanwhile a counting approach provides a framework to qualitatively 
describe the Improvement Gap (and, perhaps, quantitatively too). The value 
of that observation is in identifying that the long-term trend of technological 
progress is away from the Existing Set and to the New Set.  Thus, most 
normative questions of decarbonization are revealed as temporal—not if 
such transitions will occur but when will such transitions occur.   
What constructive analysis can counting provide?  A counting analysis 
initially confirms, in stark terms, actions an individual in the Tennessee 
Valley with a preference for (and means to) reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions should take; chiefly, purchasing elements from the New Set, 
including distributed renewable generation and an electric car.  The electric 
 




car purchase is bijective with the subset of internal combustion engine 
passenger vehicles, while the purchase of distributed renewable generation 
corresponds, but is non-injective with, the power plants owned by TVA.  
Stated differently: an electric car is the only practical substitute from the 
Existing Set to the New Set for that technological artifact, more so in this 
context,137 while there are numerous permutations for replacing energy 
generation in the Existing Set.  Note that the purchase of a hybrid-electric 
car is shown by a counting analysis to be an ineffective decarbonization 
action because it cannot constitute an element of the New Set.138    
Assuming a purchase of distributed renewable generation, whether 
rooftop or community based, did occur, counting would describe how it 
realizes the Improvement Gap on at least two separate levels.  At the global 
level, improvement in the selected technologies might result in 
manufacturing scale, supply chain efficiencies, increased investment in 
research and development and other factors that have been experienced.  
(This known qualitative observation may, again, be responsive to 
quantitative measurement).139  At the local level, cost declines in the New 
Set substitutes are more likely traceable to gains in learning-by-doing as, 
for example, new installers conducting repeat installations achieve 
improvements in community performance.  This is a particularly ripe area 
 
137. By way of example, the Tennessee Valley has a high rate of single car ownership 
and compared with many more urban environments, a lower incidence of public 
transportation by train. Again, a central purpose of a counting element is to consider 
substitutions from the Existing Set in a discrete, rather than abstracted manner. Local 
conditions and decisions are therefore determinative, even for globalized effects resulting 
from the Improvement Gap being realized by adoption. 
      138. The design, manufacture, and characteristics of electric drivetrains are 
fundamentally different in a hybrid internal combustion engine vehicle, therefore belying a 
claim that the Improvement Gap could be backed into by a hybrid-electric vehicle. As one 
of hundreds of examples, true electric cars do not require an engineered solution to two 
large, separated masses that dictate the design of internal combustion vehicles, i.e., fuel tank 
and engine block.  See Taking the High Road: Strategies for a Fair EV Future, UAW RES. 
DEP’T 10–12 (Spring 2019), https://perma.cc/E3V8-MVAM (highlighting important labor 
concerns in summarizing research showing that 80 percent fewer parts are required in an 
electric vehicle drivetrain (skateboard layout), and that capital investments may be reduced 
by half; hybrid-electric cars, by contrast, require more complexity and an even greater 
number of parts than an internal combustion engine vehicle).  See also Fred Lambert, Toyota 
Produces Shameful Anti-Electric Vehicle Ad to Sell Corolla Hybrid, ELECTREK (Feb. 12, 
2019, 2:50 PM), https://perma.cc/J63X-AB4F. Compare Fred Lambert, Toyota’s ‘Self-
Charging Hybrid’ Ad Is Banned in Norway, Deemed a Lie, ELECTREK (Jan. 24, 2020, 9:34 
AM), https://perma.cc/78Z6-THXT. 
139. See DRD Study, supra note 33, at 1.  A quantitative measure of dynamic change 
is related to a question the authors of the renewable portfolio standards surfaced.  It is likely 
a heavy lift for marginal and regressive tools hindered by a dependence on historical data.  
Instead, if localized actions can be shown to correspond to impacts on specific production 
curves then perhaps a rough contemporary coefficient might be described for certain cost 
factors, which could thereafter be generalized. 
 




as soft costs constitute the largest percentage of total costs for renewable 
generation systems.140   
For a less obvious effect, consider the localized discrete action and the 
resulting consequences.  Assume that the number of individuals in the 
Tennessee Valley who wish to take actions to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions are scattered geographically.  Coalition-building literature 
discusses the manner and methods that such individuals might cooperate.  
A counting analysis meanwhile can uniquely inform the strategic ends of 
such action.  For example, a counting approach observes that the John 
Sevier plant serves, primarily, Eastern Tennessee and mostly does not serve 
Central and Western Tennessee.  It considers that the local power company 
that contracts for power from TVA, the Knoxville Utilities Board (~ 
400,000 customers), is likely to be served in large part by the John Sevier 
plant.  It observes that targeted deployment of distributed renewable 
generation in, for example, Johnson City, would especially impact the 
operation of John Sevier (more generally, it would also reduce TVA’s 
electricity sales and revenue along with it).   
In this way, counting can be useful in evaluating the number of 
discrete substitutions necessary to be made from the New Set to move away 
from any specific element in the Existing Set.  Targeted defections in 
Knoxville and Johnson City would affect John Sevier and, as the sixth 
largest power plant by generation, reverberate throughout the TVA system.  
Meanwhile, TVA is highly leveraged in its finances.  The review of TVA’s 
financial position indicates that a reduction in revenue of even a few percent 
is likely to prove problematic for meeting existing debt obligations—
companies typically do not elect to grossly underfund pension obligations 
due to a surplus of operating income.  Counting thereby reveals specific 
ways that an electric utility’s position can be made responsive to specific 
individual and community preferences.  Said differently, a counting 
approach provides an analytical basis for taking strategic action to reduce 
emissions of greenhouse gases by effectively targeting discrete elements of 
the Existing Set. 
Counting is not claimed as an analytical panacea.  Even a granular 
review of a counting approach would not address related normative 
concerns.  In counting there is no efficiency lodestar or other pat positivist 
answer to determine the right way forward, although the Improvement Gap 
does provide a consideration.  Rather, a counting approach starts from an 
articulated preference of what ought to be and traces that line back through 
 
140. See supra text accompanying note 43. 
 




a realistic representation of what is, helping to reveal what needs to be done 
for those that prefer it.141 
 
iv.  A Brief Note on TVA’s Problem with Nuclear Power 
 
Nuclear power, never an energy program driven by private economic 
interest, regrettably remains severely uneconomic in 2020.156  The soft 
market for nuclear plants, domestically and internationally, reflects a long 
track record of nuclear projects substantially underperforming pro forma 
financial projections, punctuated by periodic economic and social 
catastrophe.157  Yet, nuclear power is central to understanding TVA.  In late 
2016, TVA became the first utility in the U.S. in twenty years to generate 
electricity from a new reactor, Watts Bar Unit II.  The utility before it: 
TVA.158 In fact, the TVA generation portfolio features a uniquely high 
percentage of nuclear power, thirty-nine percent,159 in part reflecting its 
history as a one-time instrument of the Atomic Energy Commission.160    
TVA’s experience with Watts Bar Unit II provides another point of 
disheartening nuclear generation data: it took over forty years from the start 
of construction of the reactor to commence electricity generation.161  The 
final cost, approximately $6.1 billion, compares with an initial budget 
projection of around $450 million.162  At present, Watts Bar Unit II remains 
underutilized, running at a net capacity factor of only 80.9 percent in 2019, 
whereas the TVA reactor fleet average is closer to ninety percent. 
Eventually Watts Bar Unit II will run closer to or above the fleet 
average, which partially explains why TVA does not anticipate needing 
new generation for the next few years.163  Nonetheless, its reactor license 
runs only for another thirty-five years, so even a couple of years of reduced 
generation carries potentially meaningful financial consequences, more so 
considering the initial high fixed costs.  In fact, more than half of the nuclear 
generation in TVA’s portfolio is coming off license between the years 2033 
and 2036, while seven out of eight reactors are off license by 2041.164 
Coming “off-license” is not a synonym for retirement, although it does 
imply a need for substantial capital investments.  The materials science 
underpinning nuclear reactor technology, like all generation sources, comes 
with a shelf life.  These problems at TVA are a specific instance of a more 
general circumstance: U.S. nuclear plants are largely all of the same 
vintage, meaning a nuclear cliff looms ahead for American utilities reliant 
on nuclear power.165 
The purpose of this brief note on nuclear power is to provide a fuller 
view of TVA’s economic and power generation circumstances and the 
 
141. Compare DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE BEING AN ATTEMPT TO 
INTRODUCE THE EXPERIMENTAL METHOD OF REASONING INTO MORAL SUBJECTS 468–470, 
474 (1896).   
 




types of considerations that may be present in a fuller electric utility 
analysis.  It also provides further context for the magnitude of the challenge 
of decarbonization for TVA.  To wit, picking up the previous delimit of the 
Existing Set, recall that TVA can replace only approximately ten percent of 
its coal generation with natural gas and still meet the 80/2050 Goal.  It then 
follows that none of its nuclear generation can be replaced by natural gas 
power even if the selected emissions performance objective were replaced 
by a looser measure.  The nearly 4,914 MW of nameplate nuclear 
generation coming off license by 2036 would, instead, need to be secured 
from either relicensed/replacement nuclear generation, or a mixture of 
renewables and energy efficiency.  These considerations would naturally 




Marginal rate analysis is a powerful tool for seeking efficient 
outcomes from the incremental, continuous type of change that experience 
indicates is most common.  Decarbonization is not a problem of continuity, 
however.  The application of marginal rate analysis to decarbonization is 
therefore often misconstrued, described here in the discussion of the issues 
of Continuity and Abstraction Biases.  Counting provides a useful 
corrective against problem misconstruction that proceeds from 
unsubstantiated assumptions of continuity.   
Specific to decarbonization, a counting approach is offered as a useful 
augment to existing analytical approaches because it reduces the problem 
to its discrete causes, the technological inputs which result in greenhouse 
gas emissions.  What matters in counting is the number of discrete 
technological substitutes necessary to reduce carbon dioxide emissions.  
This is a seemingly obvious observation obfuscated by a marginal focus on 
resultant continuous emissions and short run efficiency.   
Counting carbon provides a different framework for understanding the 
problem of decarbonization—the correspondence between an Existing Set 
of technologies that must be replaced and a New Set of technologies that 
must be deployed.  Even this simplified model of Equivalent Substitution 
Analysis (which holds promise for development) allows the observation 
that, at the set level, there is relatively more practical and theoretical 
potential for improvement in the technological artifacts that constitute the 
New Set, as contrasted with the Existing Set.  Several consequences follow 
from this Improvement Gap. 
One result is that substitutions of elements of the Existing Set for 
elements of the New Set can be expected to occur over time; thus, 
expressing a preference for decarbonization is simply articulating a 
temporal preference.  Another outcome is that decarbonization is not 
precisely a problem of collective action.  Rather, decarbonization is shown 
 




to be a problem that requires timely, targeted action from those with 
expressed normative preferences for reducing greenhouse gas emissions.  
The reason is that the process of adoption (the concept of “dispersion” in 
the technological change literature)is determinative in realizing the 
Improvement Gap.  As a result, decarbonization actions can be made to 
have strategic effect even without broad social agreement, as the case study 
indicates. 
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